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This dissertation consists of three essays, the first two on the foreign exchange market and the 
third on credit markets.  
Chapter 2 examines empirically the exchange rate – interest differential relationship in a 
co-integration framework. We test and estimate an error correction model (ECM) for the 
currency pair US dollar and British pound at the daily frequency. The exchange rate and the 
interest differential are found to be co-integrated, and the parameters in the ECM exhibit signs 
that are consistent with market practitioners’ observation concerning the relationship. The 
interest differential can thus be viewed as a long-run anchor for the two currencies’ exchange 
rate.  
In Chapter 3, we model the direct inter-dealer trading in the foreign exchange market as a 
two-stage, alternating-offer bilateral bargaining game in an asymmetric information 
environment. Under the naïve conjecture rule for updating the uninformed dealer’s beliefs, there 
exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. The PBE outcome depends on 
the informed dealer’s valuation of the future exchange rate. An alternative bargaining procedure 
is also considered which produces an identical PBE outcome.  
In Chapter 4, we re-examine the problem of credit rationing by modeling the loan 
contracting problem between a monopolist lender and the borrowers as a two-stage screening 
game in which pre-contractural and post-contractural informational asymmetry are 
simultaneously present. The screening game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Depending on the level of borrowers’ prior debts, credit rationing may or may not occur. In the 
pooling equilibrium, there is no credit rationing and all borrowers get a loan whose size is 
socially efficient. Credit rationing arises in the semi-separating equilibrium in which high-debt 
borrowers do not obtain a loan from the lender. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Financial markets are a vital part of any well-functioning economy. The studies in this 
dissertation cover the foreign exchange market and credit markets, with a particular emphasis on 
the micro aspects of the markets. 
     The foreign exchange market has long been a subject of investigation in International 
Finance. Research in this area has turned up many puzzles that have so far not been resolved. 
Among those, the uncovered interest parity (UIP) puzzle has attracted much attention in the 
academic literature. In Chapter 2, we seek to contribute to the understanding of the UIP problem 
by looking at how foreign exchange market practitioners view the problem. Within the 
framework of co-integration, we examine empirically the interrelationship between the exchange 
rate and the interest differential for the currency pair US dollar and British pound at the daily 
frequency. Our results are used to confirm an observation made by the market practitioners 
concerning the exchange rate - interest differential relation as it relates to the UIP problem. 
     The study in Chapter 3 is a contribution to the literature on financial market 
microstructure. We model the direct inter-dealer foreign exchange trading using tools from game 
theory. In this respect, we adopt a bargaining approach that has hitherto not been pursued in the 
literature. Our micro-based investigation of the foreign exchange market provides a useful 
complement to the traditional macro approach to the exchange rate determination. 
     Chapter 4 deals with credit markets. The study is motivated by the observation that 
credit markets in less developed countries are rather opaque. We re-examine the problem of 
credit rationing in such an environment, by formulating the loan contracting problem between a 
monopolist lender and a pool of heterogeneous borrowers in rigorous game-theoretic terms. 
Conditions are derived under which credit rationing may or may not arise. The techniques 
developed in this study have potential applications in other studies of the principal-agent 
problem in which adverse selection and moral hazard might be simultaneously present.  
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2.0  A COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS OF THE EXCHANGE RATE-INTEREST 
DIFFERENTIAL RELATION: CONFIRMING THE MARKET PRACTITIONERS’ 
VIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
That currency exchange rates are closely related to the interest rates of the two currencies 
involved is a common perception dating back to Keynes (1923). There have been numerous 
studies ever since that try to theorize and empirically test the various relationships between them, 
among which most notably is the interest parity hypothesis. It asserts that returns on interest-
bearing assets denominated in different currencies should be equalized through speculative 
forces in the market. Two basic forms of interest parity have received much attention in the 
literature, namely, covered interest parity (CIP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP). CIP 
involves both the spot and forward foreign exchange markets and can be stated as follows. Let 
tS  be the spot exchange rate (domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency), tF  be the 
one-period forward exchange rate (i.e., units of domestic currency to be delivered in exchange 
for one unit of foreign currency in the next period), and ti  and 
∗
ti  the one-period domestic and 
foreign nominal interest rates respectively, all effective in period t . Then what CIP asserts is the 
equality 
 
(2.1) tttt SiFi )1()1( +=+ ∗  
 
CIP has been subjected to extensive empirical testing (e.g. Branston, 1969; Marston, 
1976; Fratianni and Wakeman, 1982; Frenkel and Levich, 1975, 1977; Taylor, 1987, 1989). The 
consensus that emerges from the tests is that CIP holds reasonably well across different sampling 
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periods and under various market conditions. This is hardly surprising given that, in practice, all 
banks engaging in foreign exchange activity quote forward prices according to the relation in 
(2.1). Setting forward prices in this manner essentially eliminates a source of covered arbitrage 
profit; the latter can be achieved via simultaneous, “round-trip” trades in the spot and forward 
markets when the equality in (2.1) is violated. Indeed, the cambist interpretation of CIP is that it 
is simply an accounting identity rather than something predicted by economic theory.  
In sharp contrast, there is little consensus as to whether or not UIP holds, much less its 
explanation, despite the considerable effort devoted to the investigation of this problem in the 
literature. UIP postulates that market forces equilibrate the expected return on uncovered foreign 
currency investments to the return on comparable domestic currency investments, once both are 
converted into the same currency. Specifically, UIP hypothesis can be expressed as 
 
(2.2) ttttt SiSEi )1()1( 1 +=+ +∗  
 
where 1+tt SE  denotes the market’s expectation in period t  of the spot exchange rate in period 
1+t . The left-hand side of (2.2) represents the expected one-period gross return from investing 
one unit of foreign currency in the foreign money market in period t , and the right-hand side is 
the gross return from first converting one unit of foreign currency into domestic currency in 
period t  and then investing the proceeds in the domestic money market for one period; both are 
denominated in domestic currency. Denote by ts  the logarithm of tS  and (2.2) is approximately 
the same as 
 
)2.2( ′  ∗+ −=− ttttt iissE 1  
 
Note that a key assumption in arriving at )2.2(  is that investors are risk-neutral and hence 
their investment decisions are driven solely by the expected return without any consideration of 
the return’s variance. UIP as expressed in )2.2( ′  is not directly testable however, since 1+tt sE , the 
market’s expectation of future spot rate is not observable in general. Empirical tests have 
commonly substituted 1+ts , the realized log spot rate, under the assumption that investors form 
expectations rationally based on relevant information available at the time of forecasting; that is, 
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that investors do not make systematic forecast errors so that 111 +++ += tttt sEs ε , where 1+tε  is the 
white-noise forecast error. This combined with )2.2( ′  gives 
 
(2.3) 11 +
∗
+ +−=− ttttt iiss ε   
 
A large body of empirical work has been carried out to test the validity of UIP, typically 
employing the following specification form of regression equation 
 
(2.4) 11 )( +
∗
+ +−+=− ttttt iibass ε  
 
Under the joint assumption of risk-neutrality and rational expectations on the part of the 
investors (from both of which (2.3) follows), if UIP were to hold, the regression analysis should 
yield a slope coefficient 1=b .  
Empirical evidence, however, has soundly rejected the null hypothesis of 1=b . It reveals 
that not only is b  significantly different from the hypothesized value of 1, but it is more often 
than not negative. Froot and Thaler (1990) surveyed some 75 regression studies and reported an 
average b value of about 88.0− . In another survey paper, Engel (1996) found that a b value 
between 4−  and 3−  seemed to be a representative result. Overall, the evidence against (2.3) is 
overwhelming. 
Economists have not yet resolved the question of how to interpret the large and often 
significantly negative estimates of b , but have proposed two major possible explanations. The 
first explanation focuses on the existence of a foreign exchange risk premium. It argues that 
investors in the foreign exchange market are not totally risk-neutral – risk-neutrality being the 
assumption underlying the relation in )2.2( – but rather they are more accurately characterized as 
being risk-averse. In this light, the apparent discrepancy between ttt ssE −+1  and ∗− tt ii  can be 
explained by a risk premium: It is the existence of this risk premium that drives a wedge between 
the two quantities. Another line of explanation, while maintaining the risk-neutrality assumption, 
questions the other underlying assumption, namely, that the investors have rational expectations. 
If investors cannot be assumed to have rational expectations, then )2.2( ′  and (2.3) are not 
completely equivalent and hence the rejection of (2.3) is not necessarily evidence against )2.2( ′ , 
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the original UIP hypothesis. It thus attributes the rejection of (2.3) to the investors’ expectational 
error, 11 ++ − ttt sEs . In actuality, it may well be the case that the two explanations both have some 
merit in their own right and, when combined, may give a more accurate picture of the matter, but 
perhaps because of the difficulty involved in obtaining reliable data on market expectations for 
empirical work, whether UIP holds and, if it doesn’t, what accounts for its failure remains an 
unresolved issue, despite the fact that UIP is a key assumption in many theoretical models of 
international economics.1 
In this paper, we depart from the various theoretical standpoints adopted in the academic 
literature and instead look at how market practitioners see the UIP problem as it occurs in the 
foreign exchange market. After all, it is what those market players believe and how they act 
based on their beliefs that determine the exchange rates observed on the market. As it turns out, 
if one were to subscribe to their view about the exchange rate movements, the empirical failure 
of UIP would seem less of a puzzle than it has been for the economists. However, this paper, 
although closely related to it, is not an attempt to resolve the issue of UIP per se; rather its 
primary purpose is to empirically confirm a regularity observed in the actual market as it relates 
to the UIP, in a cointegration framework. The main contribution of the paper is the finding that 
there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between the US dollar - British pound bilateral 
nominal exchange rate and the short-term nominal interest differential of the two currencies at 
the daily frequency, and that the nominal exchange rate adjusts through an error correction 
mechanism in response to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, a comparison is made 
between how practitioners and economists view the UIP problem, as motivation for the paper. 
Section 3 presents a simple model of currency portfolio holdings which theoretically justifies the 
empirical work that follows.  In Section 4, we empirically examine the US dollar – British pound 
bilateral exchange rate series in relation to the interest differential series in the framework of 
cointegration, where the associated ECM is derived and is subsequently used in an out-of-sample 
forecasting comparison with a first-difference VAR. Summary and conclusion are contained in 
Section 5. 
 
                                                 
1 See Lewis (1995) for a detailed account of the UIP problem. 
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2.2 DIFFERING VIEWS OF PRACTITIONERS AND ECONOMISTS ON THE UIP 
PROBLEM 
2.2.1 An Explanation Based on Foreign Exchange Market Institution 
The deviation from UIP implies that there are un-exploited profits in the market. This is 
most clearly seen from the following relation: 
 
(2.5) 11 )( ++ +−+=− ttttt sfbass ε  
 
which is derived from combining (2.4) and the log-linearized version of  (2.1). Given the validity 
of CIP, (2.5) is equivalent to (2.4). A finding of negative values of b then means, for example, if 
the currency is traded at a forward discount in the current period (i.e. tt sf < ), it tends to 
appreciate in the next period. In such a situation, buying forward in that currency would have 
yielded a profit. According to the efficient market hypothesis, however, this type of arbitrage 
profit should not exist, at least not for long, as speculative forces in the market would have 
eliminated it. Yet, deviations from UIP (or, equivalently, forward bias) persist and un-exploited 
profits do seem to exist. And this is what economists find difficult to explain. 
While this phenomenon is seemingly at odds with the efficient market hypothesis from a 
theoretical point of view, practitioners seek to explain the puzzle by drawing on the institutional 
realities of speculation in the market. The foreign exchange market is a complex interconnected 
web of heterogeneous players. Lyons (2001) divides them into several categories: leveraged 
investors, unleveraged investors and nonfinancial corporations. He argues that unleveraged 
investors (e.g., insurance companies) and nonfinancial corporations in general do not engage in 
currency speculation, presumably due to their comparative disadvantage in the activity. Indeed, 
as McKinnon (1979) puts it, “the freeing of capital for speculative purposes in the foreign 
exchanges can hardly be given a high priority by big companies whose existence in the long run 
depends on their expertise in manufacturing and commerce.” 
Leveraged investors (e.g., proprietary bank traders and hedge funds) who do have the 
potential and expertise in exploiting the forward bias, Lyons contends, allocate their speculative 
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capital largely based on the Sharpe ratio.2 The Sharpe ratio of currency strategies exploiting the 
forward bias, based on historical data, has been roughly 0.4 on an annual basis, similar to that of 
a naive strategy of buying and holding an equity index, and well below most institutions’ 
minimum threshold for inducing capital allocation.3 From the practitioners’ perspective, then, the 
lack of speculative capital allocated to exploiting the forward bias leads to its persistence. 
Additional evidence supporting the seemingly very risk-averse behavior of the leveraged 
investors is provided by Carlson (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), both taking into account 
the institutional features of speculative activities as undertaken by bank traders and hedge fund 
managers.   
Excluded from Lyons’ description of foreign exchange market participants are the 
numerous individual investors who have to decide on where to park their idle money. Admittedly 
more comparatively disadvantaged, the individual investors are even less likely to speculate in 
the forward exchange market. Goodhart and Taylor (1992), after studying the minimal size of 
standard forward contracts and the associated transactions costs, conclude that the vast majority 
of individual wealth holders will be deterred from seeking to speculate in the market, given 
“reasonable” estimates of their coefficients of relative risk aversion. Indeed, “commercial banks 
have never made it easy for individuals who were not major depositors to take speculative 
positions” (McKinnon, 1979). 
The overall picture that can be gleaned from the above institution-based descriptions is 
that most, if not all, participants in the foreign exchange market do not engage in the risky 
activities of forward speculation, which explains the persistence of the forward bias (or, 
equivalently, the deviation from UIP). 
 
2.2.2 The Random Walk View of Exchange Rate Movements and its Implications 
The empirical evidence cited in Section 1 reveals an important point regarding the 
relationship between the exchange rate change, tt ss −+1 , and the two currencies’ interest 
                                                 
2 Sharpe ratio is defined as the ratio of a financial portfolio’s excess return to its standard deviation over a specific 
period; see for example Bodie et al (1998). 
3 Based on Lyons’ own discussions with proprietary traders at banks and hedge funds; see Lyons (2001). 
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differential, ∗− tt ii . That is, a negative slope coefficient b in the regression equation (2.4) means 
that, on average, when the domestic currency’s interest rate exceeds that of the foreign currency, 
the domestic currency tends to subsequently appreciate relative to the foreign currency, and vice 
versa. This is the exact opposite of how UIP predicts exchange rate should move, which makes 
the explanation even more difficult than if b  were positive. 
The conceptual argument for UIP is indeed quite simple. It is essentially one of 
(uncovered) arbitrage. A hypothetical situation depicted in Froot and Thaler (1990) illustrates 
this: 
 
… suppose that the one-year (US) dollar interest rate is 10 percent, and that the 
comparable German mark interest rate is 7 percent…Risk neutral, rational investors then must 
expect the dollar to depreciate against the mark by 3 percent over the next year…If instead these 
investors expected a different rate of dollar depreciation, say 4 percent, they would all wish to 
borrow in dollars and lend in marks. Consequently, dollar interest rates would tend to rise and 
mark interest rates would tend to fall until the interest differential also became 4 percent. 
 
The reasoning behind this perceived equality between the (unobservable) expected 
depreciation rate and the (observable) interest differential is a simple supply-demand analysis as 
applied to the money market: If the interest differential between US dollar and German mark is 
different from the expected depreciation rate, then borrowing and lending activities in the two 
currencies (which take place in the money market), motivated by the expectation of earning an 
arbitrage profit, will eventually bring the two back in line. Thus, the very fact that we observe a 3 
percent interest differential, with the US dollar rate exceeding the German mark rate, implies that 
investors expect a 3 percent depreciation of US dollar. Note that a crucial assumption that 
underlies this reasoning is that market participants, based on all relevant information, believe that 
the exchange rate will move in a certain direction by a certain percentage in the next period. 
If, however, the market participants view exchange rate change as inherently 
unpredictable, or more specifically, if they believe the exchange rate is as likely to go up as go 
down tomorrow, then their currency allocation pattern is likely to be rather different from that 
described in the above hypothetical example. That currency exchange rate follows a random 
walk process, whether perceived or actually so, is a well established proposition in the academic 
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literature (e.g., Goodhart, 1988). Ever since the seminal finding of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that 
none of then existing structural models of exchange rate determination performed better than a 
random walk model in out-of-sample forecasting exercises, the random walk model has become 
a benchmark in the empirical literature against which many subsequent models are evaluated, 
and yet none of those models seem to have prevailed over the random walk model, at least over 
short time horizons (Rogoff, 2001). Moreover, as Adams and Chadha (1991) have demonstrated, 
although the actual exchange rate movement may have been determined by a structural model, it 
is still hard to distinguish from a random walk. 
Whether the exchange rate movement is perceived by market participants as following a 
random walk is perhaps more important than whether it is actually so, to the extent that market 
expectation influences market outcome. Empirical studies that employ survey data on market 
participants’ exchange rate expectations find that the hypothesis cannot be rejected that market 
participants form their expectations in a fashion that amounts to assuming a random walk model 
(Allen and Taylor, 1990; Frank and Froot, 1990). 
Given that most investors do not take speculative positions in a particular currency as 
argued in the previous section, it seems plausible that those investors will place their currency 
investments as if they didn’t take any view on the exchange rate movement. This is especially 
true of the individual investors who arguably lack the necessary expertise to make reliable 
predictions about the rate change that they can use to guide their investment decisions. Choie 
(1993) describes an attitude best characterized as “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” 
which he claims as being prevalent among currency investors. This attitude dictates that, in the 
face of uncertainty about future exchange rate movement, today’s known interest differential 
outweighs tomorrow’s unknown exchange rate change in determining the short-term flow of 
funds in the market. Regarding the relation between the exchange rate change and interest 
differential, he echoes an observation repeatedly made by currency traders “…as the interest rate 
differential between two currencies increases, the currency of the country with higher short-term 
interest rate appreciates relative to the other currency…”   In light of the above described 
attitude, this observation can be explained by a simple supply-demand analysis, this time taking 
place in the foreign exchange market: The increased interest rate of a currency induces the 
investors to shift their portfolio holdings toward that currency and creates a higher demand for it 
in the foreign exchange market, leading to the subsequent appreciation of the currency. In a 
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sense, this analysis is the flip-side of the same kind of analysis that takes place in the money 
market, in the above hypothetical example of Froot and Thaler: The supply-demand condition in 
the money market influences the price of money (i.e. the interest rate), while the supply-demand 
condition in the foreign exchange market influences the price between two monies (i.e. the 
exchange rate). Hopper (1997) notices a similar currency price movement pattern which he 
describes as an example of the technical trading rules used by some currency traders. 
If the divergence of opinions among the economists and currency traders can be viewed 
as representing a tension between theory and practice, another group of practitioners, the central 
bankers, probably will sympathize more with the currency traders’ views about the exchange rate 
– interest differential relationship than with the economists’. Monetary authorities have long 
been known to use the tool of interest rate to alter the path of future exchange rate: raising the 
domestic interest rate to defend a weak domestic currency and reducing it to resist an undesirable 
appreciation of the domestic currency. Here, again, the basic premise is that market participants 
tend to respond to the incentives created by the increased interest differential, by increasing their 
demand for the currency with a now-higher interest rate, which in turn raises it price, as long as 
there remains uncertainty in their assessment of the future exchange rate movement. 
2.3 A SIMPLE MODEL OF CURRENCY PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS 
In the conventional approach to the UIP problem agents’ expectations about future spot 
rate are assumed to be summarized in a single value, 1+tt sE . Indeed, the relation 
∗
+ −=− ttttt iissE 1  is what’s termed the Uncovered Interest Parity. This characterization of 
market expectation suffers from its inability to allow for explicit modeling of the risk associated 
with the exchange rate. Though, in its attempt to explain the empirical failure of the UIP based 
on the risk argument, the conventional approach does introduce the notion of risk premium to 
account for the apparent discrepancy between ttt ssE −+1  and ∗− tt ii , it does so only in an indirect 
way; namely, the quantification of risk is not derived from the agent’s utility maximizing 
behavior. Risk premium, which is believed to be the force driving a wedge between ttt ssE −+1  
and ∗− tt ii  in this line of explanation, is a measure of compensation for the agent’s willingness to 
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bear the risk of future exchange rate change. This (subjective) risk, of course, arises from the fact 
that tomorrow’s spot rate viewed from today is a random variable rather than a single value, 
from the agent’s perspective. Hence, the quantity 1+tt sE  - if it exists at all because it is 
unobservable anyway - is at best interpreted as a summary measure of the agent’s expectations 
about tomorrow’s spot rate; it fails to capture the full content of his expectations. 
In the finance literature, by contrast, it is customary to model risk explicitly by assuming 
that investors view asset returns as following a certain fully specified stochastic process and 
derive asset allocation decisions from the more primitive principle of utility maximization. A 
classic example is Harry Markowitz’s mean-variance analysis of portfolio choice and the related 
CAPM, in which investors are assumed to be maximizing a utility function defined over the 
mean and variance of asset returns (Markowitz, 1952).  
Recall that our story of why interest differential change leads to exchange rate change 
hinges on the following assumption: In the face of uncertainty about tomorrow’s exchange rate 
change which we characterize as following a random walk process, agents tend to shift their 
portfolio holdings toward the currency that earns a higher relative interest, while also taking into 
account the separate but related goal of risk diversification. In this section we develop a simple 
model based on agents’ utility maximization that is capable of bolstering this assumption to some 
extent. 
Consider a representative agent with period t domestic currency holding in the amount of 
tm . Denote by ts the spot exchange rate (amount of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency), by ti  the one-period domestic interest rate, and by 
∗
ti  the one-period foreign interest 
rate, all effective in period t. The agent has a utility function ( )⋅u  exhibiting constant absolute 
risk aversion defined over his wealth measured in domestic currency: ( ) WeWu θ−−=  with 0>θ . 
The agent views the spot exchange rate in the next period, 1+ts , as essentially following a 
random walk process with a zero-mean normal error term, that is, 11 ++ += ttt ss ε  where 1+tε  ~ 
N ( )2,0 σ , which implies that 1+ts  ~ N ( )2,σts . He maximizes his expected period 1+t  utility 
by allocating funds in domestic and foreign currencies in the amount of tm1  and tm2  
respectively, in period t. This yields the following budget constraint faced by the agent in period 
t: 
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(2.6) tttt msmm 21 +=  
 
His period 1+t wealth measured in domestic currency is given by  
 
(2.7) ( ) ( )∗++ +++= tttttt imsimW 11 2111  
  
which upon substituting (6) gives 
(2.8) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tttttttt isismimW +−+++= ∗++ 111 121  
 
1+tW , being a linear transformation of the normal random variable 1+ts , is itself a normal 
random variable distributed as N ( )2
11
, ++ tt WW σμ , where  ( ) ( )ttttttW iismimt −++= ∗+ 211μ  
and ( ) 22222 11 σσ ∗+=+ ttW imt .  To simplify notation, let ( )tt imA +≡ 1 , ( )ttt iisB −≡ ∗  and 
( )σ∗+≡ tiC 1  so that tW BmAt 21 +=+μ  and 2222 1 tW mCt =+σ . 
With the above parameterizations, the agent’s expected period 1+t utility can be written 
as 
 
(2.9) ( ) ( )∫∞
∞−
−−−
−− −=− + dwe
Cm
eeE t
t
t mC
BmAw
t
wW
t
2
2
2
2
2
1 2
22
1
π
θθ  
 
Using a change of variable and the identity ∫∞
∞−
− = πdxe x2 , we get 
 
(2.10) ( ) ( )ttt BmAmCWt KeeE 222221 21 +−− =− + θθθ   
 
where 0<K is a constant which doesn’t depend on tm2 . Differentiating the right hand side of 
(2.10) with respect to tm2  yields the condition for the maximization of ( )1+−− tWt eE θ  as 
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Solve for tm2  and we have 
 
(2.12) 
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This is the optimal amount of foreign currency the agent chooses to hold in his portfolio 
during period t.4 It makes intuitive sense as the expression indicates that the higher the agent’s 
risk aversion (a larger θ ) and/or the higher the exchange rate’s variation (a larger 2δ ), the less 
the agent chooses to hold in the foreign currency.5  
 Taking partial derivatives of tm2  with respect to 
∗
ti  and ti respectively, we get 
( )( )
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∂
∗
t
t
t
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i
s
i
m
θσ , since 0>θ , and 1<
∗
ti  in 
general.  Although a complete comparative statics result may well depend on the relative 
magnitudes of the relevant parameters in the model, there are at least two cases where an 
unambiguous relationship exists between the interest differential change and the change in the 
agent’s currency holdings: Other things being equal, an increase in the foreign interest rate 
induces the agent to hold more foreign currency, and an increase in the domestic interest rate 
reduces his holdings of foreign currency and thus raises his holdings of domestic currency, if his 
holdings of the two currencies were both positive initially. While the model is admittedly a 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, 
( )
( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+
−= 2*2
*
2
1
,0max
t
ttt
t
i
iism θσ . 
5 We must emphasize though that this is a consequence of our choice of the domestic currency as the currency of 
denomination in the agent’s utility specification. On the other hand, it seems plausible to define domestic investors’ 
utility function in terms of domestic rather than foreign currency. 
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highly ad hoc and simplistic one in that, for one thing, the results are not invariant to the choice 
of currency denomination in the agent’s utility specification, the model nevertheless lends some 
support to our basic premise concerning the relationship between the interest differential change 
and the change in agents’ currency portfolio holdings. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section we apply Johansen’s multivariate cointegration techniques to investigate 
the interrelationship between the US dollar – British pound exchange rate and the interest 
differential of the two currencies. The analyses in the preceding sections suggest that these two 
variables cannot drift too far apart in the long-run, that is, they are tied together in a dynamic 
process, because a change in the interest differential tends to cause a corresponding change in the 
exchange rate. Thus the two variables exhibit a kind of co-movement which renders themselves 
amenable to an analysis in the cointegration framework. 
In the traditional regression analysis, a high value of 2R  generally is indicative of a 
strong causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This is not the case 
though, if the variables involved are non-stationary, as demonstrated by Granger and Newbold 
(1974). In fact, a high 2R  in such a case might merely indicate a high contemporaneous 
correlation rather than a meaningful causal relation between the variables, a phenomenon 
Granger and Newbold call “spurious regression.” In principle,  non-stationary variables can be 
made stationary by differencing, and a regression analysis can then be conducted on the 
differenced variables. However, the resulting regression equation will only capture the short-run 
dynamics (i.e. the relationship between the variables’ changes rather than that between their 
levels), and ignore possible long-run relationships that might still exist.  
The concept of cointegration as elaborated by Engle and Granger (1987) deals with just 
such a problem. A non-stationary time series variable tX is defined to be integrated of order d, 
denoted by ( )dI , if it must be differenced d times in order to achieve stationarity. ( tX  is also said 
to have d unit roots.) In general, a linear combination of two ( )dI  variables, tX  and tY , is itself 
an ( )dI  variable. If it happens that a particular linear combination tt YX βα +  is 
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( )bdI − with 0>b , then tX  and tY  are said to be cointegrated. In most applied work, the 
variables of interest are usually ( )1I , and cointegration then requires that a linear combination 
exist that is ( )0I , i.e., stationary. A great advantage of the existence of a cointegration 
relationship is that it allows one to examine simultaneously the short-run dynamics as well as 
long-run relationships between the non-stationary variables, via the associated error correction 
mechanism (ECM). 
2.4.1 Data 
The daily US dollar – British pound bilateral exchange rates used in this study are taken  
from www.oanda.com for the period from January 2001 until December 2003. For the daily 
interest rates of the two currencies during the same period, we use the Eurocurrency rates, more 
specifically, the 3-month London InterBank Offer Rates (LIBOR), taken from 
www.economagic.com. Among the wide range of available interest rates on assets denominated 
in the two different currencies that can be of potential use for our study, Eurocurrency rates 
enjoy the highest degree of comparability, in terms of issues like regulation, tax, capital control 
and sovereign risk, compared with other types of interest rates such as those on government 
bonds of the respective countries. This rather homogeneous feature of the Eurocurrency rates 
makes them most suitable for our purpose. The Eurocurrency market typically offers instruments 
with maturities ranging from overnight to one year. We choose to use the 3-month rate because it 
is the most heavily traded maturity on the market (see for example Dacorogna et al, 2001). If 
there exists any systematic relationship at all between the exchange rate and the interest 
differential, such a relationship is more likely to be manifest in the 3-month rate than in other 
less heavily traded maturities. 
2.4.2 Unit Root Tests  
As a first step in the cointegration analysis stationarity tests, commonly known as unit 
root tests, are conducted on the log exchange rate series tXR  (expressed as dollar/pound) and the 
interest differential series tID  (expressed as British rate minus US rate). This is  accomplished by 
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employing the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which involves the following OLS 
regression: 
 
(2.13) ∑
=
−− +Δ+++=Δ
p
i
tititt uxxtx
1
1 ββγα  
 
The null hypothesis of the ADF test is 0=β (corresponding to tx being non-stationary) 
and the alternative hypothesis is 0≠β (corresponding to tx being stationary). Dickey and Fuller 
(1979,1981) show that the test statistic,τ , does not have the standard t distribution; critical 
values of τ under the null are tabulated in Fuller (1996). 
A typical problem encountered in conducting the ADF test is the appropriate choice of p, 
the number of lagged differences of the variable to be included in the regression equation. It is 
not a priori clear what value of p should be used, since the underlying data generating process 
for the series is generally unknown. In fact, it is not uncommon for the ADF test to indicate a 
unit root for some lags but not for others (see, for example, Enders 2004). Since our focus here is 
on detecting whether a unit root is present in the time series and not on determining an 
appropriate univariate model for it, we choose to conduct the ADF tests using a variety of lag 
lengths, ranging from 0 to 20. This also has the benefit of ensuring a degree of robustness, if the 
results from different lag lengths agree with each other.  
Table 2.1 reports the stationarity tests for the two series being studied. It provides strong 
evidence that both tXR  and tID  series are ( )1I : (a) For the original series, the null hypothesis 
that tXR  is non-stationary cannot be rejected at the 95% significance level in all 21 lag 
specifications, and  the null hypothesis that tID  is non-stationary cannot be rejected at the 95% 
significance level in 19 out of 21 lag specifications; (b) for both first-difference series, tXRΔ  and 
tIDΔ , the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected in favor of the alternative of 
stationarity for all 21 lags, at the 95% level.  Overall, then, for our currency pair and the chosen 
sample period, it appears appropriate to treat tXR  and tID  both as ( )1I  series. 
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2.4.3 Applying the Johansen Procedure 
Having established that tXR  and tID  are both ( )1I  we turn now to the test of 
cointegration between the two series. The purpose is to examine whether a stationary linear 
combination exists and, if so, to derive the associated error correction model.  
2.4.3.1 Methodology 
To test for cointegration between two series tx  and ty , the original Engle-Granger 
methodology, after having ascertained that both series are ( )1I , proceeds by estimating an OLS 
regression of the form: 
 
(2.14) ttt ebxay ++=  
 
The residual series, teˆ , from the above regression is then tested for stationarity. A 
cointegration relationship between tx  and ty  is obtained if teˆ is determined to be stationary, with 
the associated cointegrating vector ( )b,1   (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
Johansen (1988) extends the Engle-Granger method to deal with situations where there is 
any number of variables and thus possibly multiple cointegrating vectors in the system,6 based 
on a maximum likelihood estimation procedure (see also Johansen, 1991; Johansen and Juselius, 
1990). There is some evidence that this method is more powerful at detecting a cointegration 
relationship among ( )1I  variables than the Engle-Granger two-step method, especially in small 
samples.7 Perhaps also due to the wide availability of software for its implementation,8 the 
Johansen procedure has become the “method of choice” for cointegration analysis (Kennedy, 
2003). We thus choose Johansen over Engle-Granger for our analysis of the bivariate system  
                                                 
6 In general, an n-variable system can have between 0 and 1−n independent cointegrating vectors. However, the 
cointegrating vectors themselves are not uniquely identified; only the linear space spanned by them, called the 
cointegrating space, is uniquely identified. 
7 MacDonald and Taylor (1994), for example, find non-cointegration in a monetary model of exchange rate 
determination using the Engle-Granger two-step procedure but find cointegration using the Johansen procedure, for 
the same sample of data. 
8 For example, SAS provides PROC VARMAX for cointegration analysis using the Johansen procedure; RATS has 
an add-on program CATS that is devoted to the Johansen procedure exclusively. 
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Table 2-1 ADF Tests for the Exchange Rate and Interest Differential Series 
________________________________________________________________________           
 Lags            tXR                          tXRΔ                           tID                          tIDΔ  
________________________________________________________________________ 
   0       )2283.0(72.2−       )0001.0(33.28 * <−      )0004.0(89.4 *−    )0001.0(81.21 * <−    
   1       )2208.0(74.2−       )0001.0(75.19 * <−       )0054.0(16.4 *−    )0001.0(44.18 * <−  
   2       )2764.0(61.2−       )0001.0(73.15 * <−       )1784.0(85.2−      )0001.0(61.16 * <−  
   3       )1867.0(83.2−       )0001.0(34.13 * <−       )2947.0(57.2−     )0001.0(65.14 * <−  
   4       )1574.0(92.2−       )0001.0(97.11 * <−       )3032.0(55.2−     )0001.0(63.12 * <−  
   5       )1767.0(86.2−       )0001.0(26.10 * <−       )2655.0(63.2−     )0001.0(35.10 * <−  
   6       )1538.0(93.2−       )0001.0(65.9 * <−         )2930.0(57.2−     )0001.0(20.10 * <−  
   7       )1654.0(89.2−       )0001.0(59.9 * <−        )2175.0(75.2−     )0001.0(50.9 * <−  
   8       )1387.0(98.2−       )0001.0(83.8 * <−         )2597.0(65.2−     )0001.0(31.8 * <−  
   9       )2182.0(75.2−       )0001.0(51.8 * <−         )1409.0(97.2−     )0001.0(66.7 * <−  
   10     )2317.0(71.2−       )0001.0(46.8 * <−         )1499.0(94.2−     )0001.0(43.7 * <−  
   11     )2878.0(58.2−       )0001.0(97.7 * <−        )1409.0(97.2−     )0001.0(24.7 * <−  
   12     )2563.0(65.2−       )0001.0(89.7 * <−        )2405.0(69.2−     )0001.0(25.7 * <−  
   13     )2732.0(62.2−       )0001.0(12.8 * <−        )2255.0(73.2−     )0001.0(24.7 * <−  
   14     )4039.0(35.2−       )0001.0(71.7 * <−        )2017.0(79.2−     )0001.0(79.6 * <−  
   15     )3669.0(42.2−       )0001.0(55.7 * <−        )2141.0(76.2−     )0001.0(61.6 * <−  
   16     )3411.0(47.2−       )0001.0(27.7 * <−        )1340.0(00.3−     )0001.0(25.6 * <−  
   17     )4294.0(31.2−       )0001.0(61.6 * <−         )1656.0(89.2−     )0001.0(86.5 * <−  
   18     )3242.0(51.2−       )0001.0(57.6 * <−        )2055.0(78.2−     )0001.0(70.5 * <−  
   19     )3515.0(45.2−       )0001.0(37.6 * <−        )2203.0(74.2−     )0001.0(59.5 * <−  
    20    )3626.0(43.2−       )0001.0(04.6 * <−        )1623.0(90.2−     )0001.0(96.5 * <−  
________________________________________________________________________   
Notes: a) SAS Version 8 was used to calculate the test statistics; b) numbers in parentheses are p-values 
associated with the test statistics; c) an asterisk (*) indicates significant at 95% level. 
 19 
consisting of tXR  and tID , although both methods are applicable in the present context. 
Denote ( )′= ntttt zzzz ,...,, 21 where each itz  is an ( )1I  variable. The Johansen procedure 
for testing cointegration among the components of tz starts with the following vector 
autoregression (VAR): 
 
(2.15) tptptt zAzAAz ε++++= −− ...110  
and rewrites it in the error correction form as: 
(2.16) ∑−
=
−− +Δ++=Δ
1
1
10
p
i
tititt zzz επππ  
where 00 A=π , ∑
=
+−=
p
j
jAI
1
π , ∑
+=
−=
p
ij
ji A
1
π , and tε  is a vector of iid Gaussian errors. 
The key insight of the Johansen testing procedure is that the rank of the matrix π  is equal 
to the number of independent cointegrating vectors existing among the n component variables of 
tz . The rank of π , in turn, is equal to the number of its non-zero eigenvalues. Denote the 
estimated eigenvalues of π  in descending order as nλλλ ˆ...ˆˆ 21 ≥≥≥ , some of which may be 
zero. Johansen (1988) proposes the following two test statistics: 
 
(2.17) ∑
+=
−−=
n
rj
jtrace Tr
1
)ˆ1log()( λλ  
and 
 
(2.18) )ˆ1log()( 1max +−−= rTr λλ  
where T  is the number of observations in the data. The first, called the trace test, has as its null 
hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors, against the alternative that there are 
more than r cointegrating vectors in the system. The second, the maximum eigenvalue test, tests 
the null hypothesis of exactly r cointegrating vectors, against the alternative of exactly 1+r  
cointegrating vectors. Both tests have a non-standard distribution, whose critical values are found 
in Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
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Given that the nn×  matrix π  has rank r, it can be decomposed as βαπ ′= , whereα  
andβ  are both rn×  matrices having full column/row rank, i.e., rank r.  As such, β ′  is the 
cointegrating matrix: its r linearly independent rows correspond to the r independent 
cointegrating vectors; that is, each of the r component series of the vector 1−′ tzβ  is stationary. 
Thus the elements in each row of β ′ represent the long-run parameters because they link the 
variables in the long-run. And α  is the matrix of the speed of adjustment parameters.  
The decomposition βαπ ′=  facilitates the interpretation of (2.16) as an error correction 
model. To see this, note the form of the kth equation in (2.16): the left-hand side consists of the 
single term ktzΔ , while the right-hand side, among other terms, contains a linear combination of 
the r stationary variables in 1−′ tzβ ; the coefficients of this linear combination are exactly those 
from the kth row ofα . If we think of the values of the r stationary variables in 1−′ tzβ  as 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium (or disequilibrium “errors”) in the previous period 
1−t --- since we interpret those r stationary variables as representing the long-run equilibrium 
relationships among the n variables of tz  --- then these disequilibrium errors enter the equation 
for the kth variable ktz , via the speed of adjustment parameters (i.e. elements of the kth row of 
matrix α ), to make the necessary “correction” (i.e. adjustment) of this variable, toward a long-
run equilibrium in the current period  t.  In fact, if n ( )1I  variables are cointegrated, then there 
must exist an error correction representation for these variables in the form of (2.16), and vice 
versa. This result is known as the Granger representation Theorem. 
A practical issue that arises when applying the Johansen procedure is the appropriate 
choice of the lag length p in the VAR model specification of (2.15). One way to handle this is by 
invoking some information criterion such as Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) which typically 
minimizes some function involving the sum of squared residuals, the number of parameters in 
the model and the number of observations used in the estimation.  
Yet another issue involved in the Johansen procedure concerns the form of the 
deterministic term 0π in (2.16):  an unrestricted 0π , or a restricted 0π . In the former case, there is 
a linear trend in each of the variables of tz , while in the latter, there is an intercept term in each 
of the r cointegrating vectors. Which specification is appropriate given the data can be 
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determined by employing a likelihood ratio test as described in Johansen (1991) and Johansen 
and Juselius (1990). 
Besides providing maximum likelihood estimation ofα  andβ ′ , the Johansen procedure 
also allows for testing hypotheses about the elements of α  andβ ′ . In particular, one is often 
interested in testing whether a particular row ofα  is zero.  Denote the kth row of α  as kα , then 
the kth  equation in (2.16) has the following form: 
 
(2.19) +′=Δ −1tkkt zz βα  other terms  
 
If 0=kα , then the kth variable ktz does not respond to those disequilibrium errors from 
the previous period 1−t , and thus the remaining 1−n  variables in tz do all of the adjustment, 
through the error correction mechanism, to induce a long-run equilibrium in the current period t. 
In this case, ktz  is said to be weakly exogenous. A likelihood ratio test is available for testing the 
weak exogeneity of a particular variable in the system. 
Various linear restrictions on β ′ , the cointegrating matrix, can also be tested. In our 
analysis, we are interested in whether a particular variable in the system can be excluded from 
the cointegration relationships, or, equivalently, whether that variable’s coefficient appearing in 
the cointegrating vectors is significantly differently from zero. Again, the Johansen procedure 
offers a likelihood ratio test for this purpose. 
2.4.3.2 Results 
Let ( )′= ttt IDXRz , be the vector containing the two variables under investigation. 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) selects a lag length of 4=p  for the VAR model in (2.15). 
As a robustness check, we apply another criterion, Final Prediction Error Criterion of Hsiao 
(1979) to the system, which gives the same lag length for the model as AIC.   
 Results from both traceλ  and maxλ tests are reported in Table 2.2.  As shown, traceλ  test 
rejects the null of  0=r  in favor of the alternative 0>r , but does not reject the null of 1≤r , 
both at the 95% significance level. Although this result alone is sufficient to pin down the 
number of cointegrating vectors, results of the maxλ test provide further evidence: it rejects the 
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null of 0=r  in favor of the alternative 1=r , but does not reject the null of 1=r , both at the 
95% significance level. Thus, we conclude that the cointegration rank is one, i.e., there exists a 
single cointegration relationship between the two variables tXR  and tID . 
 
 
Table 2-2  Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue Tests  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Null Hypothesis     Alternative Hypothesis        Test Statistic     95% Critical Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
       traceλ  tests                       
           0=r                           0>r                              19.09                     15.34 
           1≤r                            1>r                                 0.45                       3.84 
        maxλ tests 
           0=r                           1=r                               18.63                      14.07 
           1=r                           2=r                                 0.45                        3.76 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: SAS Version 8 was used to calculate the test statistics.    
 
Conditional on 1=r , a likelihood ratio test is performed for the restriction on 0π . This 
test, as shown by Johansen (1991), has a 2χ distribution with 1=− rn degree of freedom. The 
calculated test statistic is 5.44 with an associated p-value of 0.0196 (the 95% critical value for 
the 2χ distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84 ), so the null hypothesis  that the 
deterministic term 0π  has a restricted form can be rejected at the 95% significance level, 
implying that the cointegrating vector does not contain an intercept and that (2.16) includes a 
nonzero constant term. 
 Having confirmed the existence of a single cointegrating vector and the form of the 
deterministic term in (2.16), maximum likelihood estimation produces the error correction 
models for the exchange rate series tXR  and the interest differential series tID  respectively as: 
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(2.20) 100318.000046428.0 −−−=Δ tt ecmXR  
                         11 01526.004756.0 −− Δ+Δ− tt IDXR  
                         22 00202.001415.0 −− Δ+Δ− tt IDXR   
                         ttt IDXR 133 00694.000818.0 ε+Δ+Δ+ −−  
and 
 
(2.21) 101840.000653.0 −+−=Δ tt ecmID  
                         11 13656.007461.0 −− Δ+Δ− tt IDXR  
                         22 03686.006794.0 −− Δ+Δ+ tt IDXR  
                         ttt IDXR 233 02570.015930.0 ε+Δ−Δ+ −−  
  
where the error correction term is given by 111 30251.0 −−− −= ttt IDXRecm . Thus, in the notation 
introduced above, )01840.0,00318.0( ′−=α , which is the matrix of the speed of adjustment 
parameters, and )30251.0,1( −=′β , the cointegrating matrix.9 
The likelihood ratio test for weak exogeneity, which Johansen (1991) shows is distributed 
as 2χ  (with one degree of freedom in the present case since there is one restriction on each kα ), 
yields test statistic values 8.40 and 8.06 for tXR and tID respectively. Since both values exceed 
the 95% critical value of 3.84, the null hypothesis that tXR (or tID ) is weakly exogenous can be 
rejected. This means that both variables tXR  and tID respond to the disequilibrium error in 
making the adjustments toward the system’s long-run equilibrium. Finally, likelihood ratio test 
for the significance of the 1−tID coefficient in the above expression of 1−tecm , which is also 
distributed as 2χ  with one degree of freedom, rejects the null hypothesis that this coefficient is 
zero, since the calculated value of the test is 15.39 which exceeds the 95% critical value of 3.84. 
The adjustment parameters )01840.0,00318.0( ′−=α  and the long-run parameters 
)30251.0,1( −=′β , taken together, have the “correct” signs. First, the negative coefficient  in 
                                                 
9 The cointegrating matrix (or space) is uniquely identified if the leading coefficients of all the cointegrating vectors 
are normalized to one. 
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(2.20) and the positive coefficient in (2.21) for the 1−tecm term mean that when, for example, 
030251.0 111 >−= −−− ttt IDXRecm and other things remain unchanged, tXR  decreases and 
tID increases so that the system is brought closer to its long-run equilibrium in period t, which is 
exactly how the error correction mechanism is supposed to work. Second, since tID is defined as 
the British interest rate minus the US interest rate and tXR  is expressed in dollar/pound, the 
positive coefficient for the 1−tID term in (2.20) [i.e., (-0.00318)*(-0.30251)>0] implies that, other 
things being equal, an increase in the interest differential of the two currencies tends to cause a 
subsequent appreciation of the British pound. This is in agreement with how the currency traders 
observe the exchange rate moves in response to an interest differential change in the foreign 
exchange market, as elaborated in the preceding sections. 
2.4.4 Forecasting Comparison with the Unrestricted VAR Model 
 As a last bit of the empirical analysis, we assess the adequacy of the above ECM model 
by comparing its forecasting ability with that of a comparable VAR model. The VAR to be 
considered is one based on the first differences of the variables, namely, 
( )′ΔΔ=Δ ttt IDXRz , with the same lag structure as the ECM in (2.16), which we denote by 
DVAR. Note that this specification of DVAR makes it a model that is “nested” in the ECM 
model, since the latter has the form of a DVAR augmented with the error correction term 1−tzπ . 
Thus, the marginal contribution of the error correction term can be assessed in term of the 
model’s forecasting ability, which in turn can serve as an indication of the adequacy of the model 
specification. 
For our purpose we only need the exchange rate equation from the DVAR, and it is given 
by the usual maximum likelihood estimation as: 
 
(2.22) 11 01404.003859.000015514.0 −− Δ+Δ−=Δ ttt IDXRXR  
            22 00037413.000443.0 −− Δ+Δ− tt IDXR    
            ttt IDXR 133 00492.001641.0 η+Δ+Δ+ −−  
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The forecasting comparison is conducted as follows. Taking as known the values of the 
exchange rate variable tXR  and the interest differential variable tID  up to period 1−t , the 
estimated models in (2.20) and (2.22) are used to forecast the exchange rate change in period t, 
respectively. The forecast error is defined as the difference between the actual change and the 
forecasted change from each model. We use the root mean square error (RMSE) as a criterion to 
judge the relative forecasting performance of the two models.  
Recall that the ECM and DVAR were initially estimated for the sample period from 
January 2001 until December 2003, using the daily data. Our forecasting exercise essentially 
employs a one-step-ahead out-of-sample forecasting procedure, and uses daily data from the first 
two months of 2004 which have a total of 41 usable observations. Since 4 lagged values of each 
variable are needed to calculate the first RMSE, a total of 37 RMSEs are obtained for each of the 
two model specifications and are reported in Table 3. 
The results in Table 2.3 show that the ECM model outperforms the DVAR model in 33 
out of all 37 forecast periods, by the RMSE criterion. Presumably this difference in out-of-
sample forecasting ability of the two models stems from the role played by the error correction 
term in the ECM specification. This suggests that there is likely considerable information 
contained in the disequilibrium error that is relevant for the exchange rate change, and also gives 
us additional confidence as to the adequacy of the ECM model in describing the dynamic process 
of the two variables under investigation. 
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Table 2-3 Forecasting Comparison between ECM and DVAR 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Number of Periods    RMSE from ECM          RMSE from DVAR     Comparison 
     _________________________________________________________________ 
                   1                         0.001952997                   0.001825336                     
                   2                         0.005200512                   0.005311347                    * 
                   3                         0.006780523                   0.006900219                    * 
                   4                         0.005912105                   0.006012086                    * 
                   5                         0.00529591                     0.005384015                    * 
                   6                         0.005810611                   0.005842727                    * 
                   7                         0.005864123                   0.005846308  
                   8                         0.007390023                   0.00728843 
                   9                         0.007716713                   0.007552234 
                  10                        0.009583386                   0.009592167                     * 
                  11                        0.009321197                   0.009347438                     * 
                  12                        0.009235342                   0.009267595                     * 
                  13                        0.009484942                   0.009511817                     * 
                  14                        0.00934222                     0.009345481                     * 
                  15                        0.009171004                   0.009201905                     * 
                  16                        0.008931858                   0.008948854                     * 
                  17                        0.008704283                   0.008712472                     * 
                  18                        0.008463336                   0.008468768                     * 
                  19                        0.008240141                   0.008248846                     * 
                  20                        0.008299598                   0.008332706                     * 
                  21                        0.008121555                   0.008149856                     * 
                  22                        0.00793502                     0.007962481                     * 
                  23                        0.007832563                   0.007868824                     * 
                  24                        0.007802126                   0.007849312                     * 
                  25                        0.007779789                   0.007832675                     * 
                  26                        0.007900937                   0.007956972                     * 
                  27                        0.007753779                   0.007808905                     * 
                  28                        0.007651972                   0.007703461                     * 
                  29                        0.007528395                   0.007581298                     * 
                  30                        0.007505658                   0.007566017                     * 
                  31                        0.007565753                   0.007616156                     * 
                  32                        0.007459926                   0.007512712                     * 
                  33                        0.008032431                   0.008059074                     * 
                  34                        0.007927781                   0.007960779                     * 
                  35                        0.008080284                   0.008133515                     * 
                  36                        0.008182141                   0.008220125                     * 
                  37                        0.008116216                   0.008148125                     * 
      _______________________________________________________________________________ 
       Note: An asterisk (*) denotes that the RMSE from ECM is smaller than the RMSE from DVAR.  
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2.5  CONCLUSION 
Inspired by the reasoning behind the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition in the theoretical 
literature and drawing on an observation made by the foreign exchange market practitioners, we 
have investigated in this paper the interrelationship between the US dollar – British pound 
exchange rate and the interest differential of the two currencies, at the daily frequency. The two 
variables are found to be cointegrated with cointegration rank one, and the associated error 
correction model (ECM) is derived whose parameters are demonstrated to have correct signs 
conforming to the empirical regularity observed by the market practitioners. The ECM is also 
shown to possess better out-of-sample forecasting ability compared with a comparable VAR 
model in first difference, thus confirming the important role played by the error correction term 
in the model. 
The existence of a cointegration relationship means that the interest differential serves as 
an anchor for the two currencies’ exchange rate in the long-run, which is the main thesis of this 
paper. In light of the connection between cointegration and common stochastic trends (Stock and 
Watson, 1988), one single cointegration relationship in a two-variable system implies that the 
exchange rate and the interest differential share one common stochastic trend; this common 
trend, itself non-stationary, can be interpreted as being determined jointly by the two countries’ 
macroeconomic variables such as money supply and inflation rate.10 Clearly, the exchange rate 
and the interest differential both are closely related to those macroeconomic variables. And this 
provides an alternative interpretation of the results in this paper. 
The present work can be extended in at least two directions. First, we have only used the 
3-month Eurocurrency rate in our analysis. Though it is argued that the 3-month rate seems to be 
the most appropriate maturity for our purpose, including other maturities in the ECM might have 
the potential to improve the model’s forecasting ability, since those other rates may contain 
information relevant for the exchange rate that is absent in the 3-month rate. Another extension 
concerns the data frequency. By the very nature of the speculative activity in the foreign 
exchange market, the exchange rate should respond to the change in interest differential much 
more swiftly than at the daily frequency. Our analysis would be better carried out using higher 
                                                 
10 At the daily frequency, these determinants are probably more appropriately interpreted as news or expectations 
about the macroeconomic variables.  
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frequency, preferably tick-by- tick, real time transaction data, but whether this is possible in the 
future depends on the availability of such data. 
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3.0  DIRECT INTER-DEALER TRADING IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
MARKET: A BARGAINING APPROACH 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Markets for financial assets are organized differently in terms of the specific trading mechanisms 
employed. While much of economics regards those trading mechanisms as largely irrelevant for 
the functioning of the market and generally relegates them to the economic “black box,” it seems 
evident that, in order to gain a deeper understanding of how financial markets function to 
allocate resources, one must consider the impact different trading rules have on issues like the 
price formation process. Research in the area of market microstructure represents an endeavor in 
this direction (O’Hara, 1995). Until recently most of the market microstructure literature has 
focused on the study of equity markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
NASDAQ, and the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  
With an average daily turnover volume of almost US $1.9 trillion and still growing, the 
foreign exchange market is by far the world’s largest financial market (BIS, 2004). Given its 
importance and the fact that it shares many common features with the equity markets, the foreign 
exchange market would seem a natural candidate for the study of financial market 
microstructure. However the foreign exchange rate, the relative price of two countries’ 
currencies, traditionally has been treated in economics as a macro phenomenon; that is, it is 
viewed as being determined by macroeconomic variables, the so-called “fundamentals” which 
among other things include GDP, money supply, interest rate and inflation rate in the two 
countries. Despite the considerable research effort over the past few decades devoted to 
explaining exchange rate movements via macro channels, it is now widely acknowledged that, 
by and large, the macro approach to exchange rate determination has been unsuccessful, 
especially over short time horizons. Perhaps the most severe indictment against this approach 
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comes from the finding of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that macro-based models of exchange rate 
determination have inferior out-of-sample forecasting ability even compared with a naïve 
random walk model. Some twenty years later and many more papers written on the subject, the 
same author concludes that the failure of macro-based models is “still true” (Rogoff, 2001). This 
puzzling failure has led economists to suspect that they were probably looking in the wrong 
place for the “true” determinants of the exchange rate. To cite Flood and Taylor (1996), “Given 
the exhaustive interrogation of the macro fundamentals in this respect over the last twenty years, 
it would seem that our understanding of the short-run behavior of exchange rates is unlikely to be 
further enhanced by further examination of the macro fundamentals. And it is in this context that 
new work on the microstructure of the foreign exchange market seems both warranted and 
promising.” 
Lyons (2001) summarizes the work done so far on the foreign exchange market 
microstructure. Due to the similarity of the foreign exchange market to the equity markets, most 
theoretical models on the former are borrowed from the existing ones on the latter, though the 
empirical work uses distinctively foreign exchange data.  The purpose of this paper is to 
contribute to the theoretical front of the microstructure literature by exploiting a distinctive 
feature of the direct inter-dealer foreign exchange trading. We model the trading process as a 
sequential, alternating-offer bilateral bargaining game between two dealers whose motives for 
the trading might differ. While almost all existing work on inter-dealer trading adopts an auction-
based approach, we argue that it is only appropriate for modeling the brokered inter-dealer 
trading. Ours thus represents the first attempt to analyze an important segment of the inter-dealer 
market which has thus far left unmodeled in the literature, using a modeling apparatus that 
accords particularly well with the mechanism employed in the actual trading process.  
In contrast to the assumption of homogeneous dealers in most literature on the subject, 
which allows for the analysis to be focused on the risk-sharing aspect of the trading, we assume 
that dealers are heterogeneous; specifically, in a bilateral setting, one dealer is assumed to be a 
hedger and the other a speculator, with the latter possessing better information about the future 
exchange rate change. Still, we model both dealers as being risk averse so that risk-sharing is 
also a relevant element in the dealers’ trading decisions. Thus, in our model, inter-dealer trades 
are motivated by both risk-sharing and information-exploitation considerations. We are able to 
completely characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game which is unique 
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under some plausible restriction on the rule for updating beliefs on the part of the uninformed 
dealer. The result highlights the important role of informational asymmetry in determining the 
outcome of the bargaining game. In some cases, trades may break down (i.e., dealers remain 
autarkic) if the informed dealer deems it unprofitable to engage in any trade with the uninformed 
dealer, even though she may potentially “skim” all the informational rents.  
This paper is also a contribution to the large literature on bargaining with several novel 
features.  First, unlike most existing papers where the agents involved in the bargaining have 
deterministic valuations of the underlying asset being bargained over, in the model of this paper, 
the bargainers’ respective valuations of the asset’s future payoff are stochastic, which is a 
necessary consequence of the uncertain nature of the currency exchange rate. Second – and this 
is related to the first – in the traditional divide-the-pie bargaining models with incomplete 
information, the incomplete information is with regard to the counterparty’s valuation of the 
object, whereas in our model the incomplete information takes the form that the uninformed 
dealer is uncertain about what superior payoff-relevant information the informed dealer has. And 
third, we derive a procedure-invariant result, in contrast to other standard results in the literature 
where the outcome is generally dependent upon the bargaining procedure adopted. 
In the next section, a brief descriptive account is provided of the foreign exchange market 
with emphasis on those aspects of the market that are relevant for the modeling of inter-dealer 
trading. We also review some related work in the area. Section 3 describes the bargaining model. 
In Section 4, we analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model where two different 
bargaining procedures are considered and their outcomes compared. Section 5 concludes. 
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3.2 STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE  MARKET AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW11 
Without a centralized exchange and with a decentralized global network of players, the foreign 
exchange market is essentially an over-the-counter (OTC) market.  The players in this market, 
roughly classified, fall into one of the three types: customers, dealers, and inter-dealer brokers. 
And trades are correspondingly classified into three categories: customer-dealer, brokered inter-
dealer, and direct inter-dealer, each having its own distinct characteristics.12  
In the customer-dealer trading, dealers act as market-makers in the sense that they quote 
two-way bid-ask prices to their customers. Customers, whether retail or wholesale, in general do 
not have access to the brokers so that dealer banks are the only venues where customers can 
trade.13  Order flows from customers, from the dealer’s perspective, are largely stochastic in 
nature, which subsequently become an important source of the dealer’s inventory imbalances. 
For the purpose of the present paper, the role of the customer-dealer trading is exogenous; 
bilateral inter-dealer trading occurs only after one dealer has transacted a deal with his own 
customer. 
When a dealer receives an inventory shock as a result of customer trades, he has 
potentially two options to lay off his undesirable position in the inter-dealer market: through a 
broker or by trading directly with another dealer. In the brokered market, the broker acts as a go-
between for the client dealers, and keeps a running list of limit orders from participating dealers. 
When a dealer contacts the broker, the latter will give him the best price available (highest bid 
price and/or lowest ask price) among all the limit orders outstanding. The dealer can then hit the 
bid, take the ask, join the bid and/or ask, or improve the bid and/or ask.14  A noticeable feature of 
                                                 
11 In terms of instruments traded, the foreign exchange market comprises a spot market, a forward market, and 
markets for derivatives (futures, swaps and currency options). The description in this section will focus on the spot 
market only. 
12 Relative shares of these transaction categories by trading volume are: customer-dealer transactions account for 
approximately 25%, and inter-dealer transactions (both brokered and direct) for approximately 75% of total trading 
volume (Danielsson and Payne, 2002). Although constantly changing over time, Cross (1998) reports a share of 41% 
for the inter-dealer trading volume handled by brokers. 
13 As an empirical matter, foreign exchange dealers derive most of their trading profits from customer trades (Yao, 
1998). 
14 Prior to 1990s, all brokering in the inter-dealer market was handled by the so-called voice-brokers through 
dedicated telephone lines connecting the broker and client dealers. The advent of electronic brokerage systems (e.g., 
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this trading mechanism is that it involves a time dimension so that the market is run as a 
continuous rather than a batch auction.   
A dealer may also directly contact another dealer to ask for quotes on the currency of 
interest. While technological advances have also enabled greater trading efficiency,15 the 
bilateral, one-on-one nature of direct trading between dealers is preserved. The dealer being 
contacted quotes buy and sell prices for the amount requested, and the originating dealer may 
then decide whether to accept or pass the other’s quotes. There is no negotiation or haggling 
between the two, but if the originating dealer passes the quoting dealer’s offer and if the latter 
asks for a reciprocating quote, the former must oblige by providing his/her own quote to the 
counterparty, which is a convention in the dealer circle. 
While the classification of instruments, players, and trade types in this market is fairly 
clear, the working of the foreign exchange market is not well understood and remains something 
of a mystery, from the theoretical point of view. Many authors have studied the inter-dealer 
trading focusing mainly on the equity markets which have a multiple-dealer structure such as 
NASDAQ and LSE.16  They discuss among other issues motives for inter-dealer trading (e.g., Ho 
and Stoll, 1983; Volger, 1997; Werner, 1997; Reiss and Werner, 1998; and Viswanathan and 
Wang, 2004). Among those, risk-sharing is an important trading motive for the dealer because of 
the minimum quote size in the customer-dealer trades which at times can cause significant 
inventory imbalances for the dealer. When such imbalances arise a dealer seeks to unwind his 
undesired position in the inter-dealer market, resulting in the foreign exchange “hot-potato” 
(Lyons, 1997). To isolate the risk-sharing motive of trading from trading motives based on 
private information, dealers are often presumed to be homogeneous with respect to their 
valuation of the asset, as in Ho and Stoll (1983), Volger (1997), and Werner (1997). Other papers 
in this area dealing exclusively with the foreign exchange market include Lyons (1995, 1996a, 
1996b) and Perraudin and Vitale (1995). 
Regarding the modeling tools used in the theoretical literature on inter-dealer trading, 
most existing papers adopt an auction approach.  For example, Werner (1997) uses a double 
                                                                                                                                                             
EBS and Reuters Dealing 2000-2) has greatly improved price transparency and efficiency of order execution. 
However, the essential features of the brokered market as a continuous auction have largely remained unaltered. 
15 Reuters Dealing 2001-1, the direct inter-dealer counterpart of Reuters Dealing 2001-2, has replaced the traditional 
dedicated telephone lines between dealers that were in use prior to mid-1980s. 
16 NYSE’s “specialist” system does not qualify as an example of multiple-dealer market since a particular stock is 
assigned to only one dealer who acts as a broker-dealer to make the market in that stock. 
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auction format in which dealers simultaneously post buy and sell orders of a fixed amount, and a 
single market-clearing price is then decided by a pre-specified rule. In the auction model of 
Volger (1997), dealers are allowed to submit to an auctioneer demand schedules which unlike 
Werner’s single-price orders are a continuous set of price-quantity pairs. Here, again, orders are 
submitted simultaneously and the market clears at a single price. Viswanathan and Wang (2004) 
also employ an auction approach in their analysis of inter-dealer trading. All these papers 
represent an attempt to model the strategic interactions among dealers following their respective 
trading with customers. Due to the presence of an explicit auctioneer in their models, these 
studies are most appropriately viewed as modeling the brokered inter-dealer trading where the 
auctioneer plays the role of an inter-dealer broker. But they are not precisely consistent with the 
institutional realities of the brokered inter-dealer trading.  In the actual brokered inter-dealer 
market, the matching of buy and sell orders from dealers is conducted as a continuous auction 
(see footnote 4), rather than a batch auction as described in the models of Werner, Volger, and 
Viswanathan and Wang. To the extent that all economic models abstract from reality to some 
degree, these auction models may be seen as a first approximation to the actual market setting. 
Nevertheless, the mechanics of direct inter-dealer trading are so conspicuously different from 
those of the brokered trading as to defy any meaningful modeling by the use of auction.  
In a population context, Lyons (1997) develops a simultaneous trade model of the foreign 
exchange inter-dealer market. There all dealers are assumed to use identical quoting strategies, 
and a linear, symmetric, market-wide equilibrium price is derived as the outcome of dealers’ 
collective strategic behavior. Though also qualifying as a strategic microstructural model, his 
model does not treat dealers’ strategic interactions at the more micro level of individual 
transactions. Further, without any explicit reference to the specific mechanism used for the 
trading, the result should be viewed as describing generically the outcome emerging from both 
trading modes, brokered and direct. However, these two different types of inter-dealer trading 
clearly merit different treatments; after all, the very goal of the microstructure theory is to 
achieve a better understanding of the performance of the market, through a closer examination of 
the particulars of the trading environment which macro approaches traditionally ignore. 
Auction and bargaining are among the most researched topics in game theory as two 
basic price-generating mechanisms in a strategic setting. Whereas auction is obviously an 
appropriate modeling tool in an environment where the outcome of a game is determined by the 
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collective action of a large number of players, in a bilateral setting such as the foreign exchange 
direct inter-dealer trading, bargaining captures the rules of the game more accurately and thus is 
more suitable for the analysis. 
Since the seminal paper by Rubinstein (1982) in which non-cooperative game theoretic 
concepts are elegantly applied to a bargaining situation, numerous papers have been written on 
the subject, and the theory of bargaining has found many applications in other fields of 
economics. Indeed, the literature is too extensive to allow for a comprehensive survey here.17 
Suffice it to mention here that research has been pursued along several lines, such as whether the 
model assumes symmetric or asymmetric information and whether one bargainer makes all the 
offers or offers are made alternately by both parties. 
3.3 DIRECT INTER-DEALER TRADING AS A BARGAINING GAME 
As noted above, while the brokered inter-dealer foreign exchange trading is best modeled as an 
auction game (batch or continuous), the mechanics of direct inter-dealer trading conform most 
closely to a bargaining game between two dealers. In the latter trading mode, the dealers contact 
each other, either by telephone or on screens electronically, asking for quotes on a currency they 
are interested in trading.  A typical direct deal goes like this (Cross, 1998): 
 Dealer 1: “Spot dollar-swissie on ten dollars, please.” 
 Dealer 2: “Dollar-swissie is 1.4585-90.” 
Upon receiving dealer 2’s quotes, one of the following happens: 
Either 
 Dealer 1: “I buy (sell).” 
 Dealer 2: “Done. I sell (buy) ten dollars at 1.4590 (1.4585).” 
or 
Dealer 1: “Pass.” 
                                                 
17 A concise introduction to the subject is given in Muthoo (1999); more technical coverage can be found in Roth 
(1985), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), and Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere (2002).  
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In the above conversation, “ten dollars” is shorthand in the profession for 10 million US 
dollars18, and “1.4585-90” is to be understood as follows: Dealer 2 is willing to buy 10 million 
US dollars from dealer 1 at a price of 1.4585 US dollars per Swiss Franc (bid price), and is 
willing to sell the same amount to dealer 1 for 1.4590 US dollars per Swiss Franc (ask price). If 
dealer 1 “passes” dealer 2’s quotes, then the trading protocol dictates that dealer 1 must 
reciprocate quotes to dealer 2 if the latter so asks.19 At this stage, another conversation similar to 
the above one takes place with the roles of the two dealers reversed. If the second-stage offer of 
dealer 1 is not accepted by dealer 2, the trading session ends with no more conversation taking 
place.  
Given this sequential, reciprocal nature of the direct inter-dealer trading, we model the 
trading process as a two-stage, alternating-offer bargaining game between the two dealers. 
We noted in the previous section that risk-sharing explains much of inter-dealer trading in the 
foreign exchange market. This explanation entails not only the assumption that dealers are all 
risk-averse, but also the assumption that dealers are homogeneous in their trading motives. 
However, the second assumption is not a realistic one. As Flood (1991) points out, “Research 
into the microstructure of the foreign exchange market should presume such heterogeneity 
among market-makers … Further, it is well known that ‘taking a view,’ that is, speculating on 
future prices, is routine for many participants. To omit this heterogeneity from a model is to 
ignore an important characteristic of the market.” In view of these comments, the dealers in our 
model are assumed to possess differential information concerning the future exchange rate 
change.20 
In the bargaining literature, it is a well known fact that outcomes of a bargaining game 
depend crucially on the relative bargaining power of the two parties. In the context of our model, 
such bargaining power takes the form of a dealer’s relative degree of risk aversion as well as the 
superiority of one dealer’s private information over that of another. To isolate the effect of 
                                                 
18 In the direct inter-dealer trading, the quantity traded is usually one of a handful of “customary amounts.” (Flood, 
1991). 
19 Indeed, part of the advantage to a dealer of using brokered rather than direct trading is “the freedom not to quote 
to other market-makers on a reciprocal basis, which can be required in the direct market” (Flood, 1991). 
20 Such superior information of one dealer over another could be, for example, the result of in-house research; see 
Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1997) for empirical evidence on the existence of private information in the foreign exchange 
market. 
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private information on the bargaining outcome, we assume that the two dealers have the same 
degree of risk aversion with respect to the potential profit from trading. 
The two dealers’ preferences are identical, given by a simple form of mean-variance 
derived utility function: )~()~()~( ZVarZEZu −= , where Z~ is dealer’s stochastic trading profit.21 
The fact that dealers’ utility depends negatively on the variance of the profit implies that dealers 
are risk averse. For concreteness and ease of exposition, the two traded currencies are called 
Euro and US dollar (USD), and the exchange rate is expressed in American terms, i.e., in 
amounts of USD per Euro. The argument in the dealers’ utility function, Z~ , is measured in 
USD.22 Further, throughout this paper, we express the exchange rate as a premium or a discount 
in reference to the prevailing rate in the customer-dealer market during the current period. For 
example, if the prevailing rate in the current period is 1.1720 USD/Euro, then an exchange rate 
of 1.1730 USD/Euro will be expressed as 001.0=r (a premium), while an exchange rate of 
1.1710 USD/Euro will be expressed as 001.0−=r (a discount). Expressing the exchange rate in 
this fashion allows us to more easily keep track of the trading profits and losses of dealers. Given 
that dealers typically trade with one another in standardized quantities (see footnote 8), we 
normalize, without loss of generality, the quantity traded to one Euro.23 
Dealer 1, after having bought one Euro from his customer at the prevailing exchange rate 
in the customer-dealer market, wishes to lay off his position by contacting dealer 2 who may 
want to take a speculative position in Euro. The information structure of the game is as follows. 
It is common knowledge among all parties that next period’s exchange rate, V~ , is uniformly 
distributed over the interval ],[ vv− , which is all the information dealer 1 has ex ante regarding 
the future exchange rate change. Dealer 2 has better information than dealer 1 does, in that she 
knows that next period’s exchange rate is uniformly distributed over ],[ xx− , where vx ≤≤0  
and is only privately known to dealer 2.24 From dealer 1’s perspective, x is a random variable, 
denoted by X~ . Without further information, his best guess about X~  is that it is uniformly 
                                                 
21 Our rationale for defining the utility function over dealers’ profit rather than their total wealth partly comes from 
the celebrated prospect theory of utility, which argues that people tend to perceive changes (gains or losses) rather 
than absolute values in making economic decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
22 This is a plausible assumption if the two dealers are both US banks. 
23 The setup is thus similar to the one in the standard bargaining literature where agents bargain over the price of an 
indivisible object. 
24 These assumptions are consistent with the random walk view of exchange rate distributions; see, for example, 
Goodhart (1988). 
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distributed over its range, the interval ],0[ v . Thus, in this setup, x is the realization of a random 
variable X~  which is observed only by dealer 2; dealer 1 knows the distribution of X~ . We also 
adopt the convention in exchange rate economics to express changes in exchange rate in 
percentage terms so all values of v  and x are restricted to lie between 0 and 1.  
Though in practice a dealer always quotes two-way prices (bid and ask) as required by 
trading conventions, and the other dealer has the choice whether to buy at the ask price or sell at 
the bid price, our study will only concentrate on one side of the market. More specifically, we 
suppose that dealer 1 is only interested in laying off his position in Euro, while dealer 2 is only 
interested in taking a position in Euro; in other words, the two dealers’ roles as a buyer or seller 
in the trade are unambiguously defined. Consequently, a dealer’s quoting strategies in this game 
are restricted to a single bid or ask price but not both. 
3.4 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM 
 
In this section, we analyze the two-stage, alternating-offer bargaining game using as the solution 
concept perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). PBE is an analytic tool designed for modeling 
dynamic games of incomplete information. A generalization of both the Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium concept for static games of incomplete information and the subgame perfect 
equilibrium concept for dynamic games of complete information, PBE requires that players’ 
strategies be sequentially rational given their beliefs, and that the beliefs be derived whenever 
possible from equilibrium strategies using Bayes rule. 
A typical problem with most bargaining models of incomplete information is the 
existence of a large number of equilibria. In order to select some more plausible ones for the 
game, many authors have imposed various restrictions on the uninformed player’s beliefs about 
his opponent’s type after the latter’s move. For example, Rubinstein (1985) introduces six 
different kinds of conjectures the uninformed player can potentially have about his opponent’s 
type, some of which are quite ad hoc. For the present model, we impose a naïve conjecture rule 
on the part of the uninformed dealer: after receiving the informed dealer’s quote r to buy Euro, 
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the uninformed dealer’s belief about his counterparty’s valuation is updated to rX >~ . This 
simply says that the informed dealer’s offer price to buy never exceeds her highest valuation of 
the currency. 
We begin with the analysis of the bargaining game where dealer 1 (he, uninformed) 
approaches dealer 2 (she, informed) first for quotes on the USD-Euro exchange rate. Let 1r  
denote dealer 2’s quote to buy Euro in the first stage. Dealer 1, on receiving dealer 2’s quote, can 
either accept or decline it. If he declines, he himself quotes a price of 2r to sell Euro to his 
counterparty in the second stage, which dealer 2 then either accepts or declines. 
The PBE of this bargaining game is derived by using the usual backward induction. 
Suppose dealer 1 declines dealer 2’s first-stage offer 1r  , and makes the counter-offer 2r  in the 
second stage. Since by staying autarkic dealer 2 can obtain an expected utility of at least zero, 
dealer 1’s second-period quote 2r  will be accepted by dealer 2 if and only if the following holds: 
 
(3.1) 0)~( 2 ≥− rUu X  
 
where XU
~  is a random variable uniformly distributed on the interval ]~,~[ XX− . Given the 
distribution of  XU
~ , we have 
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Note that from dealer 1’s perspective )~( 2rUVar X − is a random variable which reflects 
his uncertainty about dealer 2’s information on next period’s exchange rate. With these 
expressions (3.1) becomes 
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This is the condition for dealer 2’s acceptance of dealer 1’s offer 2r  in the second stage. 
Clearly, 2r must be negative in order for (3.4) to hold. We can thus restrict our analysis to the 
case 02 ≤r . We have  
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Going back to dealer 2’s first stage offer 1r ,  we consider two cases: 01 ≥r  and 01 <r .  
Given our proposed naïve conjecture on the part of dealer 1, the first case is informative about 
dealer 2’s valuation; specifically, after receiving the quote 01 ≥r , dealer 1’s conjecture about 
dealer 2’s valuation is updated to 1
~ rX ≥  so that, from dealer 1’s perspective, X~  is now 
uniformly distributed on the interval ],[ 1 vr .  By offering 2r to dealer 2 in the second stage, dealer 
1 can get an expected utility of25 
 
(3.6) dxx
rv
dxr
rv
rA
v
r
r
r ∫∫ −− −−+⋅−= 221 3 21
3
2
1
2 ])2(12
1[11)(  
                      = ])3([1
9
1)3(1 32
3
1
122
1
rv
rv
rrr
rv
−−−⋅−−−⋅−  
                      = ])(
3
32
9
1[1 212
3
2
3
1
rrrv
rv
−−−−−  
for which 
 
(3.7) ])(3[1)( 12
1
2
1
2 rrrv
rA −−−=′  
                                                 
25 If 123 rr <− , then by (3.5) dealer 1’s offer 2r will never be accepted by dealer 2 so we may consider only the 
case 123 rr ≥− . The first integral in (3.6) is dealer 1’s expected utility from dealer 2 accepting 2r , and the 
second integral is dealer 1’s expected utility from dealer 2 declining 2r . 
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and 
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Solving for 0)( 2 =′ rA , we get 212 3
1 rr −= . And since 0)( 2 <′′ rA  we know that )( 2rA has 
a maximum at 212 3
1 rr −= ; the maximum value is  
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which is always negative. 
Now back to the point when dealer 2 has made an offer 01 ≥r  in the first stage and when 
dealer 1 has to decide whether to accept or decline this offer. Knowing that he will get a negative 
maximum expected utility (i.e., the maxA given above) if he declines it and thus has to make a 
counter-offer himself, dealer 1 will accept dealer 2’s first-stage offer which gives him a positive 
expected utility equal to 1r . But then dealer 2’s expected utility will be 0)2(12
1 2
1 <−− xr , where 
x  is the realization of X~ . For dealer 2, this outcome would be worse than if she had made a 
negative price offer 1r  , which will give her an expected utility of at least zero because she can 
always decline dealer 1’s second-stage offer, even if 1r  is not accepted by dealer 1 in the first 
stage. Therefore, it is never dealer 2’s best strategy to offer 01 ≥r  in the first stage. Hence, we 
may restrict our analysis to the case 01 <r  in searching for dealer 2’ best strategy. 
Again, suppose dealer 1 declines dealer 2’s first-stage offer 01 <r . This offer is 
uninformative under deal 1’s naïve conjecture in that, after receiving the offer, dealer 1’s 
conjecture about dealer 2’s valuation remains the same as the prior: X~  is distributed uniformly 
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on the interval ],0[ v . By the condition in (3.5), if ]3,0[~ 2rX −∈ , dealer 1’s second-stage offer 
2r  will be accepted by dealer 2, and hence his expected utility is 
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And for ],3(~ 2 vrX −∈ , dealer 2 will decline his offer, so dealer 1’s expected utility is  
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Note that a rationale for the above calculations of dealer 1’s expected utilities is that he 
believes dealer 2 has better information than he does about the future exchange rate. Dealer 1’s 
expected utility from quoting 2r  to dealer 2 in the second stage is thus given by 
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Clearly, )( 2rD  attains a maximum value of 
2
9
1 v−  at .02 =r   
If dealer 2’s first-period offer 1r  is such that it will be declined by dealer 1, then dealer 
2’s expected utility is zero which comes from her declining dealer 1’s second-stage offer 
02 =r and remaining autarkic, since accepting 02 =r in the second stage would get her a 
negative expected utility 0
3
1)2(
12
1 22 <−=− xx . Consequently, if dealer 2 wants to get a higher 
expected utility by inducing dealer 1 to accept her offer in the first stage, she should offer at least 
2
1 9
1 vr −= . However, dealer 2 is willing to make such an offer if and only if she can get a 
positive expected utility from doing so, that is, if and only if 
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or, equivalently, 
3
vx < . 
We summarize the above analysis in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.1.  In the two-stage, alternating-offer bargaining game between the 
informed and uninformed dealers where the informed dealer makes the first offer, if the informed 
dealer’s valuation parameter, x , for next period’s exchange rate  is such that 
3
vx < , an 
exchange of currencies occurs in which the uninformed dealer accepts the informed dealer’s 
first-stage offer price 21 9
1 vr −= ;  for other valuation parameters of the informed dealer ( i.e., 
for 
3
vx ≥ ) , there is no exchange between the two dealers. 
The no-trade result when 
3
vx ≥ is noteworthy. Here the breakdown of trade is attributed 
to the informed dealer’s valuation of the currency; it happens when her views of future exchange 
rate are such that the riskiness of the currency (indicated by a large x ) outweighs the potential 
informational rents she might gain by trading with the uninformed dealer. On the other hand, the 
uninformed dealer in this model always has a hedging motive to trade although he believes that 
his counterparty has better information regarding future exchange rate than he does. This 
contrasts with the result in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) where, in equilibrium, it is the 
uninformed trader who forgoes trading with the informed trader to avoid being taken advantage 
of by the latter.  
Research on bargaining has revealed that bargaining procedures generally matter for the 
bargaining outcome. In the actual foreign exchange inter-dealer trading, any dealer bank may 
initiate contact with another dealer bank to request quotes on a currency pair, so it is cannot be a 
priori specified which dealer should act as the initiator in a particular trade.  In view of this fact, 
we consider next the alternative bargaining procedure where dealer 1 (he, uninformed) makes 
dealer 2 (she, informed) an offer first. 
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Again, let 1r  denote dealer 1’s first-stage offer, and let 2r denote dealer 2’s counter-offer 
in the second stage if she declines dealer 1’s offer in the first stage. It is straightforward to show 
that it is not dealer 2’s best strategy to offer dealer 1 a positive 2r , because she could do (weakly) 
better by offering dealer 1 a negative 2r : in case of dealer 1 declining her offer, she gets a zero 
expected utility, and in case of dealer 1 accepting her offer, her expected utility is 22 3
1 xr −− . As 
before, dealer 2’s negative offer price 2r  is uninformative under dealer 1’s naïve conjecture. 
Using analyses analogous to those above, it can be shown that dealer 2’s second-stage offer 2r  
will be accepted by dealer 1 if and only if 22 9
1 vr −≥ , and that dealer 2 will make dealer 1 an 
offer 22 9
1 vr −=  (which dealer 1 accepts) if and only if dealer 2’s valuation of next period’s 
exchange rate is such that 
3
vx < .  To summarize, in the equilibrium of the subgame following 
dealer 2’s decline of dealer 1’s first-stage offer, dealer 1’s expected utility is 2
9
1 v− , and dealer 
2’s expected utility is 22
3
1
9
1 xv −  if 
3
vx <  and is zero if 
3
vx ≥ . 
Now back to the first stage of the game where dealer 1 makes the offer 1r  to dealer 2. It is 
not dealer 1’s best strategy to offer 21 9
1 vr −< , because there is a positive probability that dealer 
2 will accept his offer,26 and if dealer 2 accepts his offer dealer 1’s expected utility is equal to 
1r  which is strictly less than 
2
9
1 v− ,  so by offering 21 9
1 vr −< in the first stage, dealer 1’s 
expected utility from the whole game is strictly less than 2
9
1 v− . (Recall that dealer 1’s expected 
utility from the subgame following dealer 2’s decline is equal to 2
9
1 v− .) On the other hand, an 
                                                 
26 In fact, this probability is greater than
3
1
. 
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offer 21 9
1 vr −>  by dealer 1 will not be accepted by dealer 2 because, regardless of whether 
3
vx <  or 
3
vx ≥ , dealer 2 can do better by declining this offer and making her own offer in 
the second stage; consequently dealer 1’s expected utility from offering 21 9
1 vr −>  is 2
9
1 v− . 
And if dealer 1 offers 21 9
1 vr −= , this will leave dealer 2 just indifferent between accepting and 
declining the offer, regardless of whether 
3
vx <  or 
3
vx ≥ .  Assuming a tie-breaking rule that 
dealers always trade in the first stage whenever they are indifferent between trading in both 
stages, the PBE outcome of the bargaining game can be stated as follows.  
 
Proposition 3.2.  In the two-stage, alternating-offer bargaining game between the 
informed and uninformed dealers where the uninformed dealer makes the first offer, if the 
informed dealer’s valuation parameter, x , for next period’s exchange rate  is such that 
3
vx < , 
an exchange of currencies occurs in which the informed dealer accepts the uninformed dealer’s 
first-stage offer price 21 9
1 vr −= ;  for other valuation parameters of the informed dealer ( i.e., 
for 
3
vx ≥ ) , there is no exchange between the two dealers. 
 
This outcome of PBE is identical to the one in Proposition 3.1. Therefore, in contrast to 
some standard results in the bargaining literature where different procedures produce different 
outcomes (e.g. Rubinstein, 1982), we have obtained here a procedure-invariant result. A possible 
explanation is that informational asymmetry is a more important determinant of the bargaining 
outcome than the bargaining procedure. As before, it is still the informed dealer who forgoes the 
trading with the uninformed dealer when she perceives the currency as so risky that no trade with 
her counterparty will be profitable.  
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have modeled the direct inter-dealer trading in the foreign exchange market as a 
two-stage, alternating-offer bargaining game. By assuming heterogeneous and risk-averse 
dealers, our model incorporates two ingredients that are common for models of inter-dealer 
trading, namely, risk-sharing and speculation. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the 
game, the bargaining outcome depends on the informed dealer’s valuation of the currency’s next-
period payoff; there could be no trade between the two dealers if this valuation is too low, 
implying that the bargaining power lies entirely with the informed dealer. For the two alternative 
bargaining procedures considered, the equilibrium outcomes are identical. This result suggests 
that, in a bargaining situation characterized by asymmetric information, informational advantage 
might play a more important role than the bargaining procedure in determining the outcome, as 
the informed dealer in our model does not suffer the usual second-mover disadvantage when the 
uninformed dealer makes the first offer. 
We can envision at least two extensions for the model’s setup. First, we have assumed in 
our model a pre-specified role for the two dealers, namely, the uninformed dealer as the seller 
and the informed dealer as the buyer of a currency. This, in effect, leaves the dealer’s bid-ask 
price spread out of the picture. A more general model should allow the role of a dealer to be 
determined endogenously, and thus allow the inter-dealer trading to take place in a two-way 
market as it does in reality. Second, although our model attempts to provide a strategic “building 
block” for the inter-dealer trading at the level of individual pair-wise transactions, a richer model 
can be constructed which “embeds” ours in a population context. Since the actual inter-dealer 
trading is genuinely a search and matching process, such a richer model may potentially make 
use of results from the extensive theoretical literature on search and dynamic matching (see, for 
example, Corbae, Temzelides and Wright, 2002, 2003; Shi, 1995; Rupert, Schindler and Wright, 
2001). We see this as a promising direction for future research on the foreign exchange inter-
dealer trading. 
Finally we should mention that, although the bargaining model in this paper is placed in 
the context of the foreign exchange market, it is equally applicable to other securities markets 
such as the OTC markets for government and corporate bonds. In fact, as long as the trading is of 
a “direct” bilateral nature (i.e., not intermediated by a broker), and the roles of the traders are 
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symmetric in the sense that both quote buy and sell prices to their counterparty, the particular 
characteristics of the instruments traded (whether stocks, currencies or bonds) are mostly 
irrelevant for the analysis. It is for this reason that the present paper can be considered a 
contribution to the broad literature on financial market microstructure, not just that of the foreign 
exchange market. 
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4.0  MORAL HAZARD CONTRACTING AND  
CREDIT RATIONING IN OPAQUE CREDIT MARKETS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the main characteristics of the credit markets is that lenders and borrowers are 
constrained by asymmetric information.  For example, borrowing firms usually have more and/or 
better knowledge about the projects to be funded than the lending banks do.  Similarly, credit 
card holders tend to know more about their own financial status and earnings potential and thus 
more about their ability to repay their debts than the credit card companies.  A typical 
consequence of this informational asymmetry is the occurrence of adverse selection.  In addition, 
lenders are often unable to monitor the borrowers’ actions that will affect the returns to them 
once a loan has been granted, presumably due to regulatory constraints as well as the high costs 
associated with monitoring.  This is the moral hazard problem. 
Among the many problems arising in the study of credit markets, the phenomenon of 
credit rationing has received much attention in the literature. Credit rationing refers to a situation 
where, among a population of observationally indistinguishable borrowers, some borrowers 
obtain a loan from the lender while others do not. Since the demand for credit of those who don’t 
get the loan is not met, which implies the existence of excess demand in the market, this matter is 
seemingly at odds with the basic economic principle that excess demand should be eliminated by 
a price increase. In a classic paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) seek to explain credit rationing by 
appealing to the adverse selection problem in the credit market. They consider a model in which 
the bank cannot observe the riskiness of a firm’s project, and the return to the bank is affected by 
the possibility of firm’s default. They argue that, under limited liability on the part of the firm, 
raising the interest rate of the loan does not necessarily increase the return to the bank. The 
reason is that, when facing a higher interest rate, only those firms with more risky projects will 
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demand credit while the less risky ones will drop out of the market, because with the increased 
cost of loan the latter group see their projects as no longer profitable, but the more risky firms go 
on to purse their projects opportunistically due to their limited liability to the lender (that is, the 
more risky firms can expect to reap the larger return in case of project’s success but does not 
bear the larger loss if the project fails.) Thus, the risk characteristics of the pool of borrowers 
demanding credit have been adversely altered; the average borrower becomes more risky with 
the increased interest rate, from the bank’s point of view. And this consideration prevents the 
bank from raising interest rate to eliminate the excess demand.  
A number of criticisms have been raised in the literature about the model of Stiglitz and 
Weiss. One of them concerns the form of the loan contract between the lender and the borrower. 
In their model, the loan contract is exogenously specified as a standard debt contract, which 
requires the borrower to repay a fixed pre-specified amount, and which is offered to all potential 
borrowers without discrimination. In practice, however, a lender will often try to find a way to 
sort out borrowers and offer differentiated loan contracts to different borrowers; that is, in an 
environment of asymmetric information, the lender will try to screen the borrowers if he cannot 
otherwise distinguish among them. This observation has led some researchers to further examine 
the question of under what circumstances credit rationing will or will not occur. For example, 
Bester (1985) explores the idea of screening by collateral and shows that credit rationing does 
not arise if loans are collateralized. But, the result in Besanko and Thakor (1987) seems to depict 
a different story where credit rationing returns to the scene, if risk is defined by first-order 
stochastic dominance rather than by mean-preserving spread as in the above paper of Bester, 
even though collateral is employed as the screening device. Indeed, the conclusion in the original 
paper of Stiglitz and Weiss is also reversed when the definition of risk in terms of mean-
preserving spread is replaced by one in terms of first-order stochastic dominance (DeMeza and 
Webb, 1987).27  
These controversies surrounding the existence of credit rationing in the credit markets 
illustrate an undesirable aspect of models of credit rationing, namely, the conclusions may 
depend sensitively on the specification of the model’s environment in general. Moreover, in 
many such models no attempt is made to formulate the loan contracting problem in rigorous 
                                                 
27 Williamson (1987) establishes the possibility of credit rationing without making explicit reference to a definition 
of risk; in his model, credit rationing is generated by the problem of costly state verification.  
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game theoretic terms. As pointed out by Hellwig (1987), once such an attempt is made, the 
conclusions again become sensitive to the particular structure of the game, and in some cases 
equilibrium may fail to exist. For example, the model of Bester (1985) simply assumes the 
existence of an equilibrium and the result of no credit rationing is derived under this assumption. 
Overall, then, it seems that the question of credit rationing deserves further examination under 
different institutional arrangements of the market. 
In all the above papers, the occurrence of credit rationing is attributed to the existence in 
the credit market of borrowers’ hidden information (e.g., the lender cannot observe the risk 
characteristics of the borrowers’ projects). In another line of research on the problem, Bester and 
Hellwig (1987) consider the possibility of credit rationing as a result of borrowers’ hidden 
action. The borrower can choose between a “good” and “bad” investment project, characterized 
by the projects’ different return distributions (or riskiness), after having obtained the funds from 
the lender. With limited liability the borrower’s project choice has an impact on the return to the 
lender, but the loan contract cannot prescribe the choice before the project is undertaken. Under 
such circumstances credit rationing again arises, this time as a consequence of the post-
contractural informational asymmetry between the lender and the borrowers, as opposed to the 
above cases of borrowers’ hidden information present at the time of contracting which represent 
the pre-contractural informational asymmetry.  
In this paper, we study a hybrid model of the credit market in which pre-contractural and 
post-contractural informational asymmetry are simultaneously present. We reexamine the 
question of credit rationing in a richer setting characterized by both adverse selection and moral 
hazard, as compared with those found in the existing literature where the focus is typically on 
one single aspect of the informational asymmetry. Given the aforementioned sensitivity to the 
model specification of conclusions about credit rationing, such a re-examination may serve to 
contribute to our further understanding of the cause of the phenomenon.  
The particular form of pre-contratural informational asymmetry in our model is 
motivated by the observation that credit markets in many less developed countries are rather 
opaque in the sense that a lender may not easily observe a borrower’s financial status when the 
borrower applies for a loan. This hidden information of the borrower, in the form of pre-existing 
debts, poses a risk on the lender since it affects the borrower’s ability to repay the debt. We 
model the loan contracting problem between the lender and the borrower as a screening game in 
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which the borrower not only self-selects the lender’s contract offers but also subsequently 
chooses a level of work effort optimally. Since the return to the lender depends partially on the 
borrower’s choice of work effort in a stochastic fashion, this generates endogenously the risk 
faced by the lender and, in this respect, our model is similar in spirit to that of Bester and 
Hellwig (1987) where the risk to the lender is also generated endogenously by the borrower’s 
project choice. However, there is at least one important difference. Credit rationing in Bester and 
Hellwig’s model arises because, at the lender’s quoted interest rate, all borrowers demand a loan 
but the funds available to the lender are insufficient to satisfy all needs and consequently the 
lender must “somehow” ration the borrowers. In our environment, funds availability is not an 
issue because of the lender’s equity funding mode, and credit rationing arises instead from the 
lender’s perceiving the borrowers as too risky and thus forgoing the lending opportunity by 
quoting a prohibitively high interest rate. Also, in contrast to the use of collateral as the screening 
device in the papers mentioned above, the lender in our model uses the size of the loan to screen 
borrowers as collateral is no longer a feasible means with the existence of borrowers’ prior debts. 
Depending on some parameter values of the model, credit rationing may or may not occur in the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the screening game. When credit rationing does occur, it 
is the more risky (i.e., higher-debt) borrowers who drop out of the market as a result of self-
selecting the loan contracts offered by the lender.  
The study in this paper is also related to the literature on non-exclusive contracts (e.g., 
Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992, 1999; Bisin and Guaitoli, 2004; Bisin and Rampini, 2002; Kahn and 
Mookherjee, 1998; and Park, 2004). Among those Park’s (2004) paper is closest to ours but with 
some differences. He considers the moral hazard contracting problem between one single 
borrower and a lender in a model in which the borrower decides on an interim wealth level 
which subsequently becomes his private information, through borrowing in an outside credit 
market, before contracting with the lender. In our model, a borrower’s pre-existing debt is also 
her private information at the time of contracting with the lender; however, unlike the borrower 
in Park’s model who borrows from the outside source for the purpose of smoothing 
consumption, the borrowers in our model try to obtain a loan from the lender in order to fund a 
productive project. Also, the focus of Park’s paper is on incentive provision and not on credit 
rationing because it is not a relevant issue with just one single borrower, while the latter is the 
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main focus of our paper as the lender faces a population of heterogeneous borrowers in our 
model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the formal model and 
describes some institutional details of the credit markets.  Section 3 analyzes the subgame perfect 
equilibrium for the situation of symmetric information, as a preparation for and comparison with 
that in the situation of asymmetric information. We then examine in Section 4 the screening 
game where the subgame perfect equilibrium is completely characterized under different 
parameter values of the model, and its relation to credit rationing is analyzed. Conclusion and 
extensions are contained in Section 5.  
4.2 THE MODEL 
4.2.1 Opaque Credit Markets and the Coexistence of Multiple Debts 
Borrowers in the credit markets often have multiple sources from which to obtain funds. 
The consumer credit market provides a good example. In the United States, it is common for 
consumers to hold several credit cards issued by different lending banks. Bisin and Guaitoli 
(2004) estimate that a typical American household has more than seven credit cards on average. 
Most credit card debts are unsecured and thus are subject to default. As documented by Petersen 
and Rajan (1994, 1995), small businesses are also frequently able to borrow from multiple 
lenders. In Europe, multiple sources of credit are even more prevalent (see, for example, 
Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000). In all these instances, debt owed by a borrower to one 
lender can impose an externality on another lender, because the higher the borrower’s total debt 
the higher the risk of default to a lender. 
While it is practically impossible to restrict borrowers’ access to multiple sources for 
loans, institutions have been created to alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry 
between the lenders and borrowers that may arise in their absence. Credit bureaus are such an 
example. Lenders participating as members of a credit bureau share information, for example, on 
their common debtors’ financial status. Thus, when a consumer applies for a line of credit at a 
lender bank, her total indebtedness to date, among other things,  will be checked by the bank 
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using information gathered from various credit bureaus. If it is determined that her total debt is 
too high relative to her perceived ability to repay (e.g., as indicated by her annual income), the 
application will likely be turned down.   
Although countries like the United States and Britain have a relatively mature system of 
consumer information sharing among lenders, in other countries like Belgium, Italy and Spain, 
such information sharing is minimal (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). And in some less developed 
countries like China, such information sharing is virtually non-existent which partly accounts for 
the slow development of the consumer credit industry in these countries.28 Further, in most 
countries, there are regulations credit bureaus must observe which forbid the collection of certain 
types of consumer information; for example, information on debts owed to friends, relatives and 
private money lenders is generally not collected by credit bureaus. Though in principle lenders 
themselves may try to find out about a borrower’s private debts by incurring a cost, such cost 
may prove so prohibitively high as to render the practice impossible.29 
In view of these institutional realities of the credit markets, we model the borrower’s 
indebtedness at the time of applying for a new loan as simply unobservable to the lender, 
following Bizer and DeMarzo (1992). To avoid further complication of the analysis, we suppose 
in the event of a borrower’s bankruptcy that she pays off her prior debts with whatever she is 
able, before repaying the new lender’s loan. This can be justified if the prior debts are those 
owed to private lenders such as friends and relatives and the new lender is a credit card company, 
for example.30      
4.2.2 The Loan Contract 
The credit market consists of a monopolist lender and a large population of borrowers.  
The borrowers for some reason have incurred a certain amount of debt in the past, and are 
currently in a state of financial distress.  They do, however, own a productive technology which, 
                                                 
28 According to Iwasaki (2004), among all bank cards issued in China, only 5% are credit cards in the usual sense; 
the rest are what one will call debit cards in the US which require the card holder to have deposits in the bank as a 
collateral. See, also, Li et al (2005). 
29 The related literature on costly state verification addresses a similar point; see, for example, Townsend (1979), 
Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1986, 1987). 
30 While in bankruptcy proceedings law prohibits a debtor from transferring her assets (e.g., giving them away as 
gifts), private debts generally retain priority in getting repaid over debts owed to public lenders. 
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if funded by appropriate amounts of investment, can produce sufficient output to pay off the 
existing debts.  Borrowers differ in their indebtedness: some have a pre-existing debt Ld , while 
others have a pre-existing debt Hd , with HL dd <<0 .  Borrowers are otherwise identical as 
described below, and they are henceforth referred to as L-borrowers and H-borrowers according 
to their pre-existing debt level respectively. 
With a first-period investment ),0[ ∞∈l , each borrower using her technology and an 
input of work effort )1,0[∈e can produce a second-period output ),( elF . Output increases with 
effort level in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.  Specifically, we assume that F has a 
multiplicative form: )()(),( eZlfelF = , where f satisfies 0)0( =f , ∞=′ )0(f , 0>′f , 
0)( =∞′f  and 0<′′f , and )(eZ is 0-1 random variable with eeZprob == }1)({ , and 
eeZprob −== 1}0)({ .  In other words, higher effort level leads to higher probability of success 
for any fixed amount of investment. Each borrower has the following utility function: 
)()(),( egwuewU −= , defined over her wealth w and effort level e, where u satisfies 
0,0)0( >′= uu and 0<′′u , and g satisfies 0)0( =g , ∞=)1(g , 0)0( =′g , 0>′′g  and 0>′′′g .31  
Thus the borrower is risk-averse in wealth and a higher effort level costs her more in utility.  
The lender is risk-neutral who operates in the market attempting to maximize his 
expected profits.  However, the lender himself does not have the funds to invest in the 
borrowers’ technology; instead he raises the investment funds by issuing equity shares to his 
shareholders, in the amount of li , should he decide to invest that amount in the i-borrowers, 
., HLi =  It is assumed that returns from the two types of borrowers are stochastically 
independent. If the investment turns out successful, that is, if the gross return to the investment 
exceeds li  then a fraction θ−1  of the net profit goes to his share holders, and another fraction θ  
is retained by the lender as his compensation. 
All parties have limited liability. First, the borrower assumes limited liability to the 
lender.  That is, if the borrower goes bankrupt in the second period her final wealth is guaranteed 
no less than zero. Second, the lender has limited liability to the borrower’s prior creditors: when 
the borrower fails to repay her prior debts the new lender cannot be held responsible to pay off 
those debts on behalf of the borrower. Finally, the lender’s liability to his shareholders is also 
                                                 
31 An example of g satisfying these properties is xxxg −−−= )1ln()( . 
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limited in that he cannot be penalized by a negative compensation, in case the gross return to an 
investment falls below the principal. 
We model this investment process as a two-stage game as follows.  In the first period, 
after having identified an investment opportunity, the lender raises funds in the amount of l.  He 
then offers a loan contract, (l, r), to the borrower, where l is the size of the loan and r the interest 
rate.  When offered a loan contract the borrower either declines the offer, in which case she has a 
final wealth of zero (she’s also unable to repay her prior debt), and hence a zero utility in the 
second period; or she accepts the offer, in which case she heads off to work and privately 
chooses an effort level e to produce a second-period output.  If she does accept the offer then, in 
the second period, she repays her debts subject to limited liability and the seniority rule for debt 
repayment (i.e., earlier debts get repaid before the later ones can.) For simplicity we adopt a tie-
breaking rule by assuming that the borrower always declines a contract offer whenever she if 
indifferent between declining and accepting the offer, and the lender always chooses not to make 
an offer whenever he is indifferent between making and not making the offer. 
4.3 SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH OBSERVABLE DEBTS 
 
We wish to characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this contracting game.  In this 
section, we first examine as a benchmark case the situation in which the borrower’s private 
information about her prior debt is observable to the lender. 
When a loan contract is offered to the borrower, she must decide whether to accept or 
decline the offer.  The following lemma establishes the condition under which the borrower will 
accept the lender’s loan contract. 
 
Lemma 4.1. An i-borrower will accept the loan contract ),( ii rl  if and only if   
0)1()( >+−− iiii lrdlf . When this condition is satisfied the borrower chooses an effort level ei 
which is the unique solution to ))1()(()( iiiii lrdlfueg +−−=′ . 
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Proof.  It suffices to show: the borrower’s maximum expected utility by accepting the loan 
contract ),( ii rl is strictly positive if and only if 0)1()( >+−− iiii lrdlf . 
If the borrower accepts the contract ),( ii rl and chooses an effort level ei, then her 
expected utility, under limited liability, is given by 
     ]|)(})0,)1()()((max{[ iiiiiiii eeglrdeZlfuEE −+−−=   
          )(})0,)1()((max{ iiiiii eglrdlfue −+−−⋅=   
If 0)1()( >+−− iiii lrdlf , then )())1()(( iiiiiii eglrdlfueE −+−−⋅= , and Ei attains 
its maximum at the solution, ieˆ , to the equation 
(4.1)      ))1()(()( iiiii lrdlfueg +−−=′  
with the maximum value being 
(4.2)      )ˆ())1()((ˆmax iiiiiii eglrdlfueE −+−−⋅=  
It remains to show: (a) a solution to (4.1) exists and is unique, and (b) 0max >iE . 
Recall the properties of g: ,0)0(,)1(,0)0( =′∞== ggg and 0>′′g .  It follows 
immediately that g ′ is strictly increasing and 0)( >′ eg  for 10 << e . We show that g ′  is 
unbounded above.  Suppose, to the contrary, that Mg ≤′  for some 0>M .  Then, by the mean-
value theorem, for any 10 << e , there exists eˆ , with ee << ˆ0 , such that 
)0()ˆ()0()()( −⋅′=−= eeggegeg eeg ⋅′= )ˆ( .  But then MMeegeg =⋅≤⋅′= 1)ˆ()(  for any 
10 << e , contradicting the assumption ∞=)1(g .  Hence g ′  is strictly increasing and 
unbounded above, which implies that (4.1) has a unique solution 0ˆ >ie , by the intermediate-
value theorem, the continuity of g ′ , the assumption 0)0( =′g , and the fact that 
0))1()(( >+−− iiii lrdlfu (which follows from the properties of u). This proves (a).    To prove 
(b), use again the mean-value theorem. By this theorem, there exists e~ , with iee ˆ~0 << , such 
that iiii eegeeggegeg ˆ)~()0ˆ()~()0()ˆ()ˆ( ⋅′=−⋅′=−=  which, when substituted into (4.2), yields 
   ))~())1()(((ˆmax eglrdlfueE iiiiii ′−+−−⋅= 0))~()ˆ((ˆ >′−′⋅= egege ii  
using (4.1) and since 0ˆ >ie , iee ˆ~ < , and g ′  is strictly increasing.  This proves (b). 
If 0)1()( ≤+−− iiii lrdlf , then )( ii egE −= , and the maximum of  Ei is obtained at  
0=ie , with the maximum value being 0. The proof is thus complete.    
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Having established the necessary and sufficient condition for the borrower’s acceptance 
of a loan contract, we now turn to the analysis of the SPE of the screening game under various 
conditions concerning the parameter values of the model.  But before proceeding we first 
establish another lemma and define two quantities, ∗l  and ∗h , that will be needed frequently in 
later analysis. 
 
Lemma 4.2.  There exists a unique ),0[ ∞∈∗l  such that llfllf −≥− ∗∗ )()(  for any 
),0[ ∞∈l .  Moreover 1)(,0 =′> ∗∗ lfl  and 0)( >−≡ ∗∗∗ llfh . 
Proof.  Similar to that of Lemma 4.1 by noticing the properties of f : ∞=′= )0(,0)0( ff , 
0)( =∞′f  and 0<′′f .    
 
As the pre-existing debts are observable the lender can perfectly discriminate the 
borrowers by offering each type of borrower a possibly different loan contract. And since the 
returns to the investments in the two borrower types are assumed to be independent, maximizing 
the lender’s total expected profit is the same as maximizing his expected profit from each 
borrower type.  The lender’s expected profit from the i-borrower, if the latter accepts the contract 
),( ii rl and chooses an effort level ei as given in Lemma 4.1, is given by  
(*) ]|}0),})1(},0,)()((min{max{[max{ iiiiiiii ellrdeZlfE −+−= θπ . 
Note that the two max’s in the above expression, in their order of appearance, reflect 
respectively the limited liability of the lender to his own equity shareholders and that to the 
borrower’s prior creditors. 
We derive the SPE for each of the following three cases in turn. Case 1: Ldh ≤∗ ; Case 2: 
HL dhd ≤< ∗ ; and Case3: ∗< hd H . 
Case 1:  Ldh ≤∗ .  Then HLidh i ,, =≤∗ . Since, by Lemma 4.2, ∗l  is the unique 
maximum for llf −)(  and ∗∗∗ −= llfh )( , we have, for any contract offer ),( ii rl , that 
0)()1()( <−−=−−−≤+−− ∗∗∗ iiiiiiiiii lrdhlrdllflrdlf .  By Lemma 4.1, neither borrower 
type will accept the contract, and consequently the lender will make offer to neither borrower 
type.  This leads to the following theorem. 
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Theorem 4.1.  If Ldh ≤∗ , then there exists a unique SPE of the game.  In this SPE, the lender 
makes no contract offer to either borrower type; each borrower type receives a zero expected 
utility, and the lender earns a zero expected profit in the second period. 
 
Case 2: HL dhd ≤< ∗ .  First of all, the H-borrower will decline any offer from the 
lender, and thus the lender will make no contract offer to this borrower type in the SPE, as the 
analysis in Case 1 shows.  As for the L-borrower, knowing that by offering a contract 
),( LL rl with 0)1()( ≤+−− LLLL lrdlf  he will earn a zero profit in the second period because the 
L-borrower will decline such an offer, the lender will try to offer ),( LL rl  such that 
0)1()( >+−− LLLL lrdlf , to get a positive second-period expected profit. Then, since 
0)1()( >+−− LLLL lrdlf  implies 0)1()( ≥+>− LLLL lrdlf , the lender’s expected profit Lπ , 
from (*), is LLLL lreθπ = .  The lender’s problem is to maximize Lπ , or equivalently LLL lre , 
subject to the L-borrower accepting the contract and her rule for choosing Le  as described in 
Lemma 4.1.  That is, the lender solves the following maximization problem 
Maximize  LLL lre  
s.t. 
(4.3) ))1()(()( LLLLL lrdlfueg +−−=′  
(4.4) 0)1()( >+−− LLLL lrdlf  
The conditions for this problem are 
(4.5) 0)( =′′− LLL eglr λ  
(4.6) 0))1()(( =+−−′− LLLLLLL lrdlfulle λ  
(4.7) 0))1()(())()1(( =+−−′′−+− LLLLLLLL lrdlfulfrre λ  
where λ is the multiplier associated with the constraint (4.3), plus constraints (4.3) and (4.4).  
From (4.6) and (4.7) we get 
(4.8) 1)( =′ Llf  
which, by Lemma 4.2, implies ∗= llL .  And (4.5), (4.7) and (4.8) yield 
(4.9) ))1()(()( LLLLLLLL lrdlfulrege +−−′=′′  
Now, with ∗= llL , the problem reduces to finding LL re ,  which satisfy 
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(4.3′) ))1()(()( ∗∗ +−−=′ lrdlfueg LLL  
(4.9′) ))1()(()( ∗∗∗ +−−′=′′ lrdlfulrege LLLLL  
(4.4′) 0)1()( >+−− ∗∗ lrdlf LL  
Writing LdllfA −−≡ ∗∗ )( , (4.3′), (4.9′), (4.4′) become respectively 
(4.3″) )()( ∗−=′ lrAueg LL  
(4.9″) )()( ∗∗ −′=′′ lrAulrege LLLL  
(4.4″) 0>− ∗lrA L  
Note that 0>A , since 0)( >−=−− ∗∗∗ LL dhdllf  by assumption. 
 
Proposition 4.1.  There exists a unique solution ),( LL er  that satisfies (4.3″), (4.9″) and (4.4″). 
Proof.  It’s clear that for each ∗≤≤ l
ArL0 , there is a unique )1,0[∈Le  that satisfies (4.3″). 
Thus (4.3″) uniquely defines Le  as a function of Lr : )( LL rpe =  for ∗≤≤ l
ArL0 .  It is 
easily seen that p is a strictly decreasing function and is continuous, with =)0(p 0))((1 >′− Aug  
and 0)( =∗l
Ap . 
In the same way (4.9″) uniquely defines Le as a function of Lr : )( LL rqe = , where q is 
strictly increasing and continuous, with 0)0( =q  and 0)( >∗l
Aq , since 0>′u  and )( LL ege ′′  is 
increasing in Le because 0>′′′g . 
Thus finding a solution to (4.3″), (4.9″) and (4.4″) reduces to finding ),( LL er that satisfies 
)( LL rpe = , )( LL rqe =  as well as (4.4″).  Consider )()()( LLL rqrprs −≡ . Then s is continuous 
and decreasing in Lr , 0)0()0()0( >−= qps , and 0)()()( <−= ∗∗∗ l
Aq
l
Ap
l
As . 
By the intermediate-value Theorem 4., there exists a unique Lr  such that ∗<< l
ArL0  and 
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0)( =Lrs , or equivalently, )()( LL rqrp = . Let 0)()( >=≡ LLL rqrpe . Then ),( LL er  is indeed 
the unique solution to (4.3″) and (4. 9″).  Since ∗<< l
ArL0 , this solution satisfies (4.4″) also.                              
We can now state the theorem for the SPE for the case HL dhd ≤< ∗ . 
 
Theorem 4.2.  If  HL dhd ≤< ∗ , then there exists a unique SPE of the game.  In this SPE, the 
lender offers the H-borrower no contract and offers the L-borrower a contract ),( LL rl  where 
∗= llL  and ∗= LL rr , the unique solution to the equations (4.3′) and (4.9′); the L-borrower 
chooses an effort level ∗Le , the unique solution to (4.3′) and (4.9′); the L-borrower receives a 
positive expected utility, the H-borrower receives a zero utility and the lender earns a positive 
expected profit in the second period. 
 
Case 3:  ∗< hd H .  Then HLihdi ,, =< ∗ . Since the lender can perfectly discriminate 
the two types of borrowers, his maximization problem consists of maximizing his expected profit 
from each borrower type.  Clearly, the analysis for Case 2 carries over to the present case, and 
we can establish the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 4.3.  If ∗< hd H , then there exists a unique SPE of the game.  In this SPE, for 
HLi ,= , the lender offers the i-borrower a contract ),( ii rl , where ∗= lli and ∗= ii rr , the unique 
solution to (4.3′) and (4.9′) with L replaced by i;  the i-borrower chooses an effort level ∗ie , the 
unique solution to (4.3′) and (4.9′) with L replaced by i;  the i-borrower receives a positive 
expected utility and the lender earns a positive expected profit in the second period. 
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4.4 SCREENING WHEN DEBTS ARE UNOBSERVABLE 
In this section we investigate the problem of screening when the borrowers’ pre-existing debts 
are unobservable to the lender. Not knowing to which type a borrower belongs, the lender’s best 
guess is that the borrower is as likely an L-borrower as an H-borrower, and a pure strategy for 
the lender consists of choosing two loan contacts ),( rl ′′  and ),( rl ′′′′ , to be offered simultaneously 
to the borrowers.  A pure strategy for a borrower, when facing the two contracts from the lender, 
is to decide whether to accept ),( rl ′′ , to accept ),( rl ′′′′ , or to accept neither.  If the borrower 
accepts one of the two contracts, she also needs to choose a corresponding effort level as part of 
her pure strategy.  We assume that if a borrower is indifferent between two acceptable contracts 
she always accepts the one with the larger loan size.  In this way, the borrowers self-select the 
lender’s contract offers. 
4.4.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the Screening Game 
The three cases in the last section are again considered in turn, in our search for the SPE 
under asymmetric information. As it turns out, Cases 1 and 2 yield essentially the same SPE 
outcomes as those described in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.  To see this, consider for 
example Case 2 where HL dhd ≤< ∗ .  Although he cannot observe the actual pre-existing debts 
of the borrowers, realizing that no contract will be accepted by the H-borrower, the lender’s 
maximization problem in the current situation of asymmetric information is essentially the same 
as that in Section 3 for the same case HL dhd ≤< ∗ . More precisely, there is a unique SPE 
outcome of the game, in which the lender offers all borrowers the same two contracts, ),( rl ′′  and 
),( rl ′′′′ , where ∗=′ ll  and ∗=′ Lrr , the unique solution to (4.3′) and (4.9′), and ),( rl ′′′′  is any 
arbitrary loan contract satisfying 0)1()( ≤′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf L ; the L-borrower accepts the contract 
),( rl ′′  and the H-borrower accepts neither ),( rl ′′  nor ),( rl ′′′′ ; the L-borrower chooses an effort 
level ∗Le , the unique solution to (4.3′) and (4.9′); and the second-period payoffs to the three 
parties are the same as those in Theorem 4.2. 
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Therefore, ∗< hd H is the more interesting case which might give rise to different SPE 
outcomes than those in Theorem 4.3, under the current condition of asymmetric information 
about the borrowers’ pre-existing debts. We henceforth restrict our attention to this case. 
Assume ∗< hd H . We first partition the lender’s strategy space, ))},(),,{(( rlrlD ′′′′′′= , 
into five disjoint subsets: U
5
1=
=
j
jDD , where 
|)),(),,{((1 rlrlD ′′′′′′= The H-borrower accepts one of the two contracts and the  
          L-borrower accepts neither} 
|)),(),,{((2 rlrlD ′′′′′′=  The L-borrower accepts one of the two contracts, the  
          H-borrower accepts the other, and )},(),( rlrl ′′′′≠′′  
|)),(),,{((3 rlrlD ′′′′′′= The L-borrower accepts one of the two contracts and the   
          H-borrower accepts neither} 
|)),(),,{((4 rlrlD ′′′′′′= The L-borrower accepts neither and the H-borrower accepts 
          neither} 
|)),(),,{((5 rlrlD ′′′′′′= The two borrower types accept the same one contract} 
 
Definition.  An SPE of the game is called fully-separating if the lender’s strategy in this SPE lies 
in 2D ; it’s called semi-separating if the lender’s strategy lies in 31 DD ∪ ; and it’s called pooling 
if the lender’s strategy lies in 5D . 
 
We show that some of the jD ’s are actually empty and thus narrow down the search area 
for an SPE of the game. 
 
Proposition 4.2.  1D  is empty. 
Proof.  Suppose 1D  is not empty. Let 1)),(),,(( Drlrl ∈′′′′′′ . Without loss of generality suppose 
the H-borrower accepts ),( rl ′′ .  By Lemma 4.1, it must be the case that 
0)1()( >′′+−−′ lrdlf H . But then 0)1()( >′′+−−′ lrdlf L , which, by Lemma 4.1, implies that 
the L-borrower also accepts ),( rl ′′ . Hence 1)),(),,(( Drlrl ∉′′′′′′ , a contradiction.    
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Proposition 4.3.  2D is empty. 
Proof.  Suppose 2D is not empty.  Let .)),(),,(( 2Drlrl ∈′′′′′′ Without loss of generality suppose 
the L-borrower accepts ),( rl ′′  and the H-borrower accepts ),( rl ′′′′ .  It follows by Lemma 4.1 that 
(4.10) 0)1()( >′′+−−′ lrdlf L  
(4.11) 0)1()( >′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf H  
Let HL ee ,  be, respectively, the corresponding effort level choice of the L-borrower and the H-
borrower.  Then 
)())1()(( LLLL eglrdlfuev −′′+−−′=  
)())1()(( HHHH eglrdlfuev −′′′′+−−′′=  
are the second-period expected utility for the L-borrower and the H-borrower respectively. 
Using arguments analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 4.1, it’s straightforward to 
establish the following result. 
Result:  Let 2,1),()( =−≡ iegeBet ii , be two functions defined on 10 <≤ e . Denote by 
iT their corresponding maximum value.  Then the following holds:  for ),0(1 ∞∈B , 21 TT >  if 
and only if 21 BB > ; and 21 TT =  if and only if 21 BB =  
Now consider what the L-borrower’s expected utility would be if she, instead of ),( rl ′′ , 
were to choose ),( rl ′′′′ .  Let LHe  be her corresponding effort level choice.  Then the L-
borrower’s second-period expected utility is given by 
)())1()(( LHLLHLH eglrdlfuev −′′′′+−−′′=  
Similarly, if the H-borrower were to choose ),( rl ′′  instead of ),( rl ′′′′ , her second-period 
expected utility would be 
)())1()(( HLHHLHL eglrdlfuev −′′+−−′=  
where HLe  is her corresponding effort level choice when she chooses the contract ),( rl ′′ . 
The fact that the L-borrower accepts ),( rl ′′  rather than ),( rl ′′′′  means that either LHL vv >  
or  LHL vv =  and ll ′<′′ , which in turn means either 
(L1) >′′+−−′ lrdlf L )1()( lrdlf L ′′′′+−−′′ )1()(  
or 
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(L2)        =′′+−−′ lrdlf L )1()( lrdlf L ′′′′+−−′′ )1()(  and ll ′<′′  
by (10), the above Result, and the fact that u is a strictly increasing function. 
Similarly, the fact that the H-borrower accepts ),( rl ′′′′  rather than ),( rl ′′  means either 
(H1)        >′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf H )1()( lrdlf H ′′+−−′ )1()(  
or 
(H2)        =′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf H )1()( lrdlf H ′′+−−′ )1()(  and ll ′′<′  
It is a straightforward exercise to show: (L1) and (H1) together yield a contradiction, so 
do (L1) and (H2) together, (L2) and (H1) together, and (L2) and (H2) together.  These 
contradictions complete the proof of the proposition.    
Strictly speaking, we need to address the following question for the sake of completeness: 
which contract will a borrower accept if she is indifferent between two different contracts yet the 
two contracts have the same loan size?  It can be easily shown that the borrower cannot be 
indifferent between two different contracts with the same loan size, given that both contracts are 
acceptable to her. 
A corollary to Proposition 4.3 is that a fully-separating equilibrium does not exist, which 
we state as a theorem. 
 
Theorem 4.4.  Assume ∗< hd H .  In the contracting game in which the borrowers’ preexisting 
debts are unobservable to the lender and the lender screens the borrowers, there exists no SPE 
that is fully-separating. 
 
Now that 1D  and 2D  are empty we may in the search for an SPE restrict our attention 
to 543 DDD ∪∪ .  However, an SPE cannot exist in which the lender’s strategy is taken from 
4D , for he can do strictly better (i.e., earn a positive vs. zero expected profit in the second 
period) by deviating to a strategy in 3D . ( 3D  is not empty, since any contract pair 
)),(),,(( rlrl ′′′′′′  satisfying 0)1()( >′′+−−′ lrdlf L , 0)1()( ≤′′+−−′ lrdlf H  and 
0)1()( ≤′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf H  is in 3D .)  Thus the search area for an SPE is further reduced down 
to 53 DD ∪ , from which the lender chooses his best strategy. 
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In what follows we examine the conditions under which a pooling or semi-separating 
SPE exists.  For expositional convenience we collect here some of the functions, constraints, 
optimization problems and other quantities to be referenced frequently in later analysis. 
 
Functions: 
rlerleeerl HLHL 2
1
2
1),,,( +≡φ  
rleerl LL 2
1),,( ≡ϕ  
 
Constraints: 
(4.12) ))1()(()( lrdlfueg LL +−−=′  
(4.13) ))1()(()( lrdlfueg HH +−−=′  
(4.14) 0)1()( >+−− lrdlf H  
(4.15) 0)1()( ≥+−− lrdlf H  
(4.16) 0)1()( ≤+−− lrdlf H  
(4.17) 0)1()( >+−− lrdlf L  
(4.18) 0)1()( =+−− lrdlf H  
 
Optimization problems: 
(P1) Maximize  ),,,( HL eerlφ  s.t.  (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14)  
(P2) Maximize  ),,( Lerlϕ  s.t.  (4.12), (4.16) and (4.17) 
(P3) Maximize  ),,,( HL eerlφ  s.t.  (4.12), (4.13) and (4.15)  
(P4) Maximize  ),,,( HL eerlφ  s.t.  (4.12), (4.13) and (4.18)  
(P5) Maximize  ),,( Lerlϕ  s.t.  (4.12) and (4.18) 
(P6) Maximize  ),,( Lerlϕ  s.t.  (4.12) 
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Quantities 
∗l is as defined in Lemma 4.1;  ∗∗ LL re ,  are the unique solution to the equations  (4.3′) and (4.9′);  
∗∗
HH re ,  are the unique solution to the equations  (4.3′) and (4.9′) with L replaced by H; and ∗∗r  is 
the unique optimum solution to problem (P1) as given in the following Lemma 4.3. 
 
We also use the following notation:  [Maximize )(xΩ  s.t. (1), (2),…,(n)] denotes the 
maximum value of the corresponding maximization problem if an optimum solution to this 
problem exists; similarly for the notation [(P)] where (P) is the name of a maximization problem. 
Using techniques similar to those in the proof of Proposition 4.1, the following lemma 
can be proved. 
 
Lemma 4.3.  Assume ∗< hd H . The maximization problem (P1) has a unique optimum solution 
),,,( ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ HL eerl .  Moreover },max{},min{
∗∗∗∗∗∗ ≤≤ HLHL rrrrr . 
 
With these preparations we are now in a position to characterize the pooling and semi-
separating SPE of the game under asymmetric information.  This is accomplished in Theorems 
4.5 and 4.6.  Recall that we are searching for the lender’s best strategy in the set 53 DD ∪ . 
 
Theorem 4.5.  If  0}),max{1()( >+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLH , then there exists a unique SPE outcome 
of the screening game, which is pooling.  In the SPE, the lender offers both borrower types the 
same two contracts ),( rl ′′  and ),( rl ′′′′ , where ),( rl ′′ ),( ∗∗∗= rl  and ),( rl ′′′′  is such that 
0)1()( ≤′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf L ; both borrower types accept the contract ),( rl ′′ ; both borrower types 
receive a positive expected utility and the lender earns a positive expected profit in the second 
period. 
Proof.  Consider first what is the best the lender can do, if his strategy choice is restricted to 
those in 5D .  Since, in 5D , the two borrower types accept the same one contract, the lender need 
not worry about the other contract in his offer that is not accepted; he can make sure neither 
borrower type will accept the other contract ),( rl ′′′′  by, say, making 0)1()( ≤′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf L .  
Hence, noting that 0)1()( >+−− lrdlf H  implies 0)1()( >+−− lrdlf L , the lender’s objective 
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essentially is to solve problem (P1), if his strategy choice is restricted to 5D .  Now, consider 
what is the best the lender can do, if his strategy choice is restricted to those in 3D .  Again, the 
lender can just concentrate on the contract that is accepted by the L-borrower, by making the 
other contract ),( rl ′′′′  satisfy 0)1()( ≤′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf L  so that no borrower type will accept this 
contract.  So, essentially, the lender’s objective is to solve problem (P2), if his strategy choice is 
restricted to 3D . 
Under the following condition of the theorem: 
(4.19) 0}),max{1()( >+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLH  
problem (P1) has a unique optimum solution as described in Lemma 4.3, and thus the value 
[(P1)] does exist.  Consider the 4-tuple )ˆ,,,( HLL eerl
∗∗∗  where Heˆ  is given by 
))1()(()ˆ( ∗∗∗ +−−=′ lrdlfueg LHH .  Then 0ˆ >He  by (4.19).  It can be easily verified that , 
under (4.19), the above 4-tuple satisfy (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14).  We thus get 
 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ >+= lrelrelreeerl LLLHLLHLL 2
1ˆ
2
1
2
1)ˆ,,,(φ  
and hence 
(4.20) [(P1)] ∗∗∗∗∗∗ >≥ lreeerl LLHLL 2
1)ˆ,,,(φ  
 On the other hand, we have, for any ),,( Lerl  satisfying (4.12), (4.16) and (4.17), that 
(4.21) ≤),,( Lerlϕ  [ Maximize  ),,( Lerlϕ  s.t. (4.12)] ∗∗∗= lre LL2
1  
Here, the inequality in (4.21) results from dropping constraints (4.16) and (4.17) from 
problem (P2).  It follows from (4.20) and (4.21) that, for any ),,( Lerl  satisfying (4.12), (4.16) 
and (4.17), <),,( Lerlϕ [(P1)].  Hence, the lender’s best strategy, under (4.19), lies in 5D  and in 
5D  only.  And Lemma 4.3 guarantees the existence of and gives a pooling SPE.   
 
Theorem 4.6.  Assume ∗< hd H .  If 0}),min{1()( ≤+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLL , then there exists a 
unique SPE outcome of the screening game, which is semi-separating.  In the SPE, the lender 
offers both borrower types the same two contracts ),( rl ′′  and ),( rl ′′′′ , where 
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∗
∗
∗ −=′=′
l
dhrll H, , and ),( rl ′′′′  is such that 0)1()( ≤′′′′+−−′′ lrdlf L ; the L-borrower accepts 
the contract ),( rl ′′  and the H-borrower accepts neither contract; the L-borrower receives a 
positive expected utility, the H-borrower receives a zero utility and the lender earns a positive 
expected profit in the second period. 
Proof.  Again we consider the two maximization problems (P1) and (P2), under the condition of 
the current theorem: 
(4.22) 0}),min{1()( ≤+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLL  
Consider (P1) first.  If (P1) had an optimum solution, then the optimum solution should be 
),,,( ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ HL eerl  as given in Lemma 4.3.  In particular it should satisfy (4.14), i.e., 
(4.23) 0)1()( >+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrdlf H  
But (4.23) contradicts (4.22), since ∗∗∗∗ ≤ rrr HL },min{  and HL dd < .  Therefore (P1) does 
not have an optimum solution under (4.22). 
Now consider problem (P3), which is the same as (P1) except that the constraint (4.14) is 
replaced by (4.15).  Since (P1) does not have an optimum solution, constraint (4.15) must be 
binding at any optimum solution of (P3).  Thus (P3) is equivalent to (P4).  For (P4), constraints 
(4.13) and (4.18) imply 0=He .  Since =)0,,,( Lerlφ ),,( Lerlϕ , we have  
(4.24) [(P3)] = [(P4)] = [ Maximize )0,,,( Lerlφ  s.t. (4.12) and (4.18)] = [(P5)] 
Because, as shown above, (P1) doesn’t have an optimum solution, it must be the case 
that, for any ),,,( HL eerl  satisfying (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14), 
(4.25) <),,,( HL eerlφ [(P3)] 
And (4.24), (4.25) imply that, for any ),,,( HL eerl  satisfying (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14), 
(4.26) <),,,( HL eerlφ [(P5)] 
Next consider (P2).  The optimum solution to (P6), ),( ∗∗ Lrl , doesn’t satisfy (4.17) 
because 0)1()( ≤+−− ∗∗∗ lrdlf LL  by (4.22).  Thus (4.16) must be binding at any optimum 
solution of (P2).  But once (4.16) is binding (4.17) becomes extraneous.  Hence, (P2) is 
equivalent to (P5).  It can be easily shown that (P5) does indeed have an optimum solution 
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)~,~,( LL erl
∗ where ∗
∗ −=
l
dhr HL~  and ))((~
1
LHL dduge −′= − .  This optimum solution of (P5) is also 
the optimum solution of (P2), and hence  
(4.27) [(P5)] = [(P2)] 
Summarizing, we have shown, for any ),,,( HL eerl  satisfying (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14), 
that <),,,( HL eerlφ [(P2)] ,  by (4.26) and (4.27).  From this we see that, under (4.22), the 
lender’s best strategy lies in  3D  and in 3D  only, and is given by )~,( Lrl
∗  as defined above.  This 
leads to the semi-separating SPE outcome as described in the theorem     
4.4.2 Discussion of the Results 
The literature on credit rationing defines the phenomenon as a situation where some 
borrowers are unable to obtain a loan from a lender even though they are ex ante 
indistinguishable from those who do obtain a loan. So, the lender’s no-offer of loan contracts to 
some of the borrowers when their pre-existing debts are observable (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) does 
not constitute a case of credit rationing per se, because the borrowers can be distinguished ex 
ante from the lender’s point of view. Credit rationing does occur in the situation described in 
Theorem 4.6, where information about the borrowers’ pre-existing debts is asymmetric and the 
high-debt borrowers accept none of the lender’s loan offers. Early literature explains the 
phenomenon of credit rationing by the availability doctrine, which says that credit is rationed 
because the lender’s available funds are not sufficient to meet all borrowers’ borrowing needs. 
This explanation does not apply in the current environment; funds shortage does not constrain 
the lender’s ability to make loans because, with the equity funding mode, he can always raise 
enough funds if he sees profitable investment opportunities exist. Here credit rationing arises 
instead from the informational constraint the lender faces since he is unable to distinguish 
between low-risk and high-risk borrowers. 
Comparing the SPE outcome in Theorem 4.3 with that in Theorem 4.5, we see that the 
existence of informational asymmetry in the current environment does not necessarily lead to an 
efficiency loss. In both SPE outcomes, both low-debt and high-debt borrowers obtain a level of 
investment funds equal to ∗l  which is socially efficient, for ∗l  is quantity that maximizes the 
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total surplus per Lemma 4.2.  Still, interest rates charged on the borrowers are different in the 
two cases; with observable debts each borrower type is charged a possibly different interest rate 
( ∗Lr  and 
∗
Hr  in Theorem 4.3), while with unobservable debts both borrower types get the same 
interest rate ( ∗∗r  in Theorem 4.5). Since ∗∗r  lies between },min{ ∗∗ HL rr and },max{
∗∗
HL rr (Lemma 
4.3), one borrower type is made worse-off and the other borrower type better-off by the existence 
of informational asymmetry as they pay, respectively, a higher and lower interest rate than when 
the information is symmetric. 
A loss of welfare does result though, when the borrowers’ unobservable debts are too 
high as indicated by the condition 0}),min{1()( ≤+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLL (Theorem 4.6) vs. the 
condition 0}),max{1()( >+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLH  (Theorem 4.5). Under the same conditions as 
those of Theorem 4.6, if existing debts were observable, the high-debt borrowers would have 
received a positive expected utility and the lender would have earned a positive expected profit 
on this borrower type (Theorem 4.3), as opposed to the zero-payoff, Pareto-inferior outcome in 
Theorem 4.6. Clearly, the no-investment in the high-debt borrowers is a consequence of the 
lender’s inability to observe the indebtedness of this borrower type.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
We have studied in this paper a hybrid model of adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
context of credit markets, and re-examined the problem of credit rationing. When the credit 
market is opaque as is typically the case in less developed countries where information sharing 
among lenders is non-existent, the unobservability of borrowers’ financial status is a possible 
cause of credit rationing. If borrowers’ indebtedness is high enough to pose a default risk on a 
lender, credit rationing arises as a result of the lender’s trying to sort out borrowers of different 
risk characteristics. For certain parameter values, there exists a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in the screening game of our model where only low-debt borrowers obtain a loan 
from the lender.  
From the methodological point of view, this paper contributes to the inventory of existing 
principal-agent models by exploring a richer setting characterized by both pre-contractual and 
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post-contractural informational asymmetry. The non-existence of equilibrium is a typical 
problem associated with many competitive screening models. In our model of monopolistic 
screening, we are able to completely characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
screening game, and the techniques developed here have potential applicability in a variety of 
other related problems. As far as credit rationing is concerned, the present study helps in 
resolving the issue of its existence by formulating the problem in rigorous game-theoretic terms. 
Several extensions and modifications might improve the present paper.  First, note that 
there is a gap between the two cases in Theorem 4.5 and Theorem 4.6; those cases that lie 
between 0}),max{1()( >+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLH  and 0}),min{1()( ≤+−− ∗∗∗∗ lrrdlf HLL are not 
considered. Second, we have assumed for the ease of analysis that outputs from the two borrower 
types’ technology are stochastically independent. If we allow those to be correlated, then another 
kind of credit rationing is possible as the lender may then want to diversify the default risk by 
allocating funds between different borrower types (type II credit rationing), instead of granting 
the loan entirely to one borrower type and leaving the other borrower type with nothing (type I 
credit rationing). Finally, a model of competitive screening may be developed in which multiple 
lenders compete in the opaque credit market. We expect the analysis of such a model to be more 
involved than the current one and leave it as a topic for future research.  
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